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This report presents findings from exploratory research commissioned by the Department 
for Education (DfE) in order to update their understanding of how radicalisation is being 
addressed in children’s social care1. The research took place between September 2020 
and March 2021. It draws together and builds on learning across the children’s social 
care sector and key partners in relation to managing cases of radicalisation and 
extremism. It explores views on how cases, processes and practices have changed in 
the last three to four years (since previous DfE research took place1); current approaches 
in children’s social care to tackling radicalisation; examples of promising and potentially 
transferable practice; challenges encountered by children’s social care and partners; and 
current and potential future sources of information, support and guidance. The focus is 
on children and young people aged 18 and under. 
The research involved qualitative consultation with: 
• Forty-two children’s social care staff and 13 staff in Prevent and other local 
authority teams in 11 local authority case study areas – the areas were selected by 
DfE based on a mix of areas by Prevent-priority status2, by levels of experience in 
dealing with cases of radicalisation and extremism, and by geographical location 
across England.  
• Thirteen national and regional stakeholders – including representatives from 
counter-terrorism policing (CTP), the voluntary and community sector, Social Work 
England, Directors of Children’s Services and Principal Social Workers. 
Due to the focus on a relatively small number of local authority areas, findings may not 
be fully representative of the current situation across the whole children’s social care 
sector. However, commonalities in views, practice and challenges were evident across 
the 11 local authority areas, which suggests that the findings may be a useful starting 
point to understand the national picture.  
 
1 Previous similar research was conducted in 2016, which this research aims to update. See Chisholm, T & 
Coulter, A. (Kantar Public) Safeguarding and Radicalisation, for Department for Education (2017). 
2 If a local authority area has Prevent-priority status, this means they have received funding from the Home 








Prevalence, ideologies and influencers3 
The number of radicalisation cases being referred to Prevent and/or children’s social care 
in the last three to four years has generally either increased or remained static in the 
case study areas, with a sense that increased referrals relate predominantly to better 
awareness by referrers or more effective referral pathways rather than to any increase in 
the prevalence of (risk of) radicalisation locally. Most areas reported an increase in 
referrals relating to Extreme Right-Wing and/or mixed/unclear ideologies, though Islamist 
extremism remained the primary ideology in some areas even where referrals in relation 
to other ideologies had increased. 
In cases related to mixed/unclear ideologies, the specific ideology itself was perceived to 
be of less importance to children and young people than their broader search for 
belonging, or explanations for their sense of not belonging; some continually switched 
between ideologies, and they did not always hold the views associated with it. This made 
it challenging to categorise the risk and develop an appropriate response to it. 
Online influences and influencers are an increasing concern, exacerbated by children 
and young people spending even more time at home during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
This was particularly associated with radicalisation to Extreme Right-Wing and 
mixed/unclear ideologies.  
Increased recognition of the need for safeguarding responses 
There was evidence of increased understanding of radicalisation as a type of harm 
experienced by a young person (rather than, for example, primarily a behaviour 
presenting a risk to others) which requires a safeguarding response, and possible 
intervention by children’s social care. This was so regardless of the type of ideology. In 
particular, children’s social care professionals are beginning to draw closer links between 
vulnerability to radicalisation and vulnerability to other forms of exploitation which might 
involve grooming, such as child criminal exploitation (CCE) and child sexual exploitation 
(CSE). Common underlying vulnerabilities include social isolation, limited sense of 
 
3 It was difficult for stakeholders to accurately report on the actual number of cases involving radicalisation 
or extremism, but they were able to discuss their sense of prevalence within their locality or area of insight. 
As stakeholders had some involvement in radicalisation cases, their perception of prevalence might not 







belonging, low confidence/self-esteem, mental health concerns, autism, other learning 
needs, neglect and past trauma.  
Integration of radicalisation into existing processes, practices and 
partnership working 
Linked to the wider recognition of a safeguarding role in cases involving (risk of) 
radicalisation, there is increasing understanding amongst children’s social care staff that 
many existing social work frameworks and practices can be applied in response to 
radicalisation, in order to engage children, young people and families, assess risk and 
support needs, and address underlying vulnerabilities4. Indeed, most of children’s social 
care’s direct work with children, young people and families appears to draw primarily on 
the core skills, knowledge and approaches used by social workers in response to other 
forms of harm. There can, however, be additional challenges in engaging families in 
relation to radicalisation, both in cases where the influencers are within the family and in 
cases where they are extra-familial but where there is community mistrust of the Prevent 
programme or the radicalisation risk is not recognised by families.  
This is complemented by multi-agency work with a range of key partners, either directly 
or in forums such as Channel5, the multi-agency safeguarding hub (MASH) and standard 
multi-agency strategy meetings. Children’s social care staff particularly value partnership 
work with Counter-Terrorism Police (CTP) and Prevent teams to jointly screen and 
assess risk, and to identify, deliver or refer on to radicalisation-specific interventions. 
There was evidence that working relationships are improving between these key partners 
in responding to radicalisation, aided by agreed single points of contact in each 
organisation.  
However challenges remain, such as information sharing, determining and using 
thresholds, developing a shared multi-agency understanding of risk and an appropriate 
response across local authority areas. This has resulted in inconsistent responses and 
approaches to radicalisation both within and across different local authority areas.  These 
persistent challenges link back to those identified in Safeguarding and Radicalisation, 
suggesting that further work needs to be done to address these issues.   
 
4 Children’s social care responses to radicalisation tend to focus primarily on addressing underlying 
vulnerabilities, rather than ideological concerns.  Interventions addressing ideology are at present usually 
coordinated and delivered via Prevent teams and Channel. 
5 Channel provides early support for anyone who is vulnerable to being drawn into any form or terrorism or 
supporting terrorist organisations. For more information see Channel and Prevent Multi-Agency Panel 






An emerging practice area with potential to apply to radicalisation is ‘contextual 
safeguarding’.  This is an approach to understanding and responding to young people’s 
experiences of significant harm beyond their families.6  There is growing recognition of its 
potential amongst children’s social care staff and partners, as links are increasingly being 
drawn between radicalisation and other forms of exploitation. Indeed, a small number of 
the local authority areas in the study described how they have applied contextual 
safeguarding approaches to specific radicalisation concerns or have introduced 
radicalisation into multi-agency teams and meetings centred on contextual safeguarding.  
Evidence of radicalisation-specific processes and responses by 
children’s social care 
Although most elements of social care responses to radicalisation draw on core social 
work processes, skills and knowledge, there are examples of radicalisation-specific 
processes or responses which are used in some local authority areas.7 For instance, 
some areas have introduced radicalisation-specific referral, screening and assessment 
tools or have adapted their standard tools to incorporate explicit reference to 
radicalisation. There appears to be a wider range of these used than was identified 
through the previous research8 although this may be because different local authority 
areas were consulted. In a smaller number of areas, this includes adapted threshold 
documents and guidance which include radicalisation. 
Some areas with Prevent-priority status (normally those with higher prevalence of 
radicalisation cases) also have specialist radicalisation/ extremism roles within children’s 
social care. Such practitioners increase the consistency and efficacy of responses within 
children’s social care, for example by screening referrals, advising and coaching 
allocated social workers, and coordinating partnership working. In some areas this role 
has evolved organically and informally, while in others it is formalised and/or funded. In 
areas where this role is formally funded it has often been difficult to fill, either initially or 
after the original post-holder has moved on. As such, there is a risk that knowledge and 
expertise may be lost if post-holders move on.  
Variation in social workers’ confidence, knowledge and understanding 
Recent learning and development seems to have resulted in an improved consistency of 
application of social care processes to radicalisation cases as reported by both Prevent-
 
6 More information about contextual safeguarding can be found at www.csnetwork.org.uk.  
7 Radicalisation-specific interventions addressing ideology are at present usually coordinated and delivered 
via Prevent teams and Channel rather than children’s social care. 






priority and non-priority local authority areas consulted. Having said this, multi-agency 
partners working across a range of local authority areas suggested this may not be the 
case across the country. Moreover, the consistency of work with young people and 
families where there are radicalisation concerns remains a challenge.  
The primary reason for variation appears to be individual social workers’ confidence and 
skills in working with radicalisation concerns which is mainly determined by their 
experience of cases, their wider-ranging social work experience, and their understanding 
of how to apply core processes and approaches in different contexts. (This was also 
identified in the previous research).  As radicalisation cases generally make up a small 
percentage of social workers’ overall caseload, their confidence in addressing these 
concerns is often lower than confidence in addressing other forms of harm.  
Methods for information, advice and guidance 
Mandatory Prevent training is offered across all local authority areas but there is 
evidence that it is not consistently accessed (possibly due to capacity restraints) resulting 
in gaps in knowledge. Increased monitoring of uptake may therefore be useful.  In 
addition, introductory training could be adapted to make it more directly applicable to 
children’s social care staff. For example, in one case study area the Prevent team deliver 
training in partnership with a senior practitioner in children’s social care who specialises 
in radicalisation and safeguarding. The training is focused on framing the basic principles 
and approaches of the Prevent agenda in social care language and providing some 
practical guidance.  
Beyond this introductory training, delivering further training as standard to all social 
workers is unlikely to be feasible or to represent the best use of time and resources given 
the relatively low prevalence of radicalisation in comparison to other forms of harm.9 
Therefore other sources of information, advice and guidance may be more accessible 
and effective. Some local authority staff described support offered by managers and 
specialist staff at the point when social workers encounter or are allocated a case with 
radicalisation concerns, which could be a useful model. Another mechanism for 
increasing the information, advice and guidance available is developing ‘radicalisation 
toolkits’ or similar resources for social workers to access when they encounter 
radicalisation concerns.  
 
9 This is based on local authority stakeholders’ common understanding/knowledge that nationally the 
number of radicalisation cases is lower than the number of cases involving other forms of harm such as 






Key changes since previous research 
 
The findings from this research show some key changes over the last three to four years 
since the publication of Safeguarding and Radicalisation (2017)10, as well as some 
persistent challenges. Most notably, non-priority areas appear to have a better 
understanding of radicalisation as a form of harm requiring a safeguarding or child 
protection response than they may have had in 2016. However, this understanding 
remains inconsistent both within and across local authority areas, as does the extent to 
which it translates into a safeguarding response being implemented.   
A key challenge identified by the previous research was a lack of internal direction and 
dedicated processes within local authority areas on responding to radicalisation risks, 
particularly in non-Prevent-priority areas. This updated research found that referral 
processes and planning procedures in response to radicalisation are broadly used 
consistently within both Prevent-priority and non-priority areas. Having said this, 
approaches to direct work with young people and their families varies considerably 
between social workers and may be more effective if a social worker has had previous 
experience of radicalisation cases.  
Children’s social care staff’s experience of radicalisation cases also appears to be more 
important than previously reported in determining their confidence in responding to 
radicalisation concerns.  In 2020/21 experience seems to be the key driver behind 
confidence, knowledge and skills in responding to radicalisation. Previously, staff’s 
confidence was reported to be linked most closely to a local authority’s recognition of 
 
10  
This research sought to update the findings from research carried out in 2016 
(Safeguarding and Radicalisation, DfE 2017) though it should be noted that a 
different sample of local authority areas and stakeholders was consulted in each 
study.  Findings which remain consistent with the previous research therefore 
provide useful confirmation of the earlier findings suggesting certain challenges 
persist and are also relatively widespread. However, differences in the findings may 
be indicative of recent changes but may also be the result of differences in practice 
and context in the samples of local authorities included in the two research projects 
or differences in the data generated by the research. Comparisons between the 






radicalisation as a safeguarding issue (although experience was an important 
contributing factor).  
Other key challenges previously identified which seem to have persisted include: staff’s 
understanding of the link between radicalisation and exploitation; difficulty engaging 
families and communities with Prevent; issues in partnership working (and in particular 
information-sharing from police); and multi-agency understanding of children’s social care 
thresholds.  This updated research has identified a number of possible solutions to these 
challenges, including the use of specialist roles to support effective practice.  
Implications for policy and practice 
The findings of this research have several implications for policy and practice, which are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6: Implications for policy and practice. These relate 
predominantly to:  
• Strengthening the increased recognition of radicalisation as a form of harm 
requiring standard safeguarding responses. 
• Encouraging the inclusion of radicalisation in structures and approaches to 
addressing other forms of exploitation. 
• Increasing social workers’ confidence to apply their core skills and knowledge. 
• Encouraging the use of radicalisation-specific approaches where required. 
• Further investigating the inclusion of radicalisation in children’s social care 
thresholds and related guidance. 
• Promoting the routine attendance of children’s social care at Channel. 
• Cultivating more effective partnership working. 
• Establishing specialist radicalisation/extremism roles within children’s social care. 
• Maximising the efficacy and uptake of Prevent training for children’s social care. 
• Sharing good practice regionally and nationally. 






Chapter 1: Background to the research 
Aims of the research 
This exploratory research project draws together and builds upon learning across the 
children’s social care sector and key partners in relation to managing cases of 
radicalisation and extremism. It aims to provide timely and up-to-date insights into how 
children’s social care services are responding to radicalisation and extremism. 
Specifically, it builds on the findings in Safeguarding and Radicalisation by confirming 
how views, practices, challenges and variation between local authority areas have 
changed or remained the same since 2016-17, and by identifying further specific good 
and transferable practice that could help address some of the more consistently-faced 
challenges. The focus was on children and young people aged 18 and under. 
The research objectives, agreed with the DfE, are to get a clear and current 
understanding of: 
• Views amongst children’s social care professionals on how processes and 
practices have recently developed with regards to managing cases of 
radicalisation and extremism, and the types of cases emerging.  
• How children’s social care staff are currently tackling issues with a focus on 
learning from real-life cases (including interventions used, effectiveness of 
partnership working, challenges faced, and lessons learnt). 
• Good and promising practice based on evidence of what has worked in which 
circumstances, which can be shared across the sector. 
• The different challenges posed by various types of radicalisation cases 
(Islamist, Extreme Right-Wing, mixed/unclear/unstable ideologies), as well as from 
different harmful influencers (familial, extra-familial or primarily online). 
• What sources of information, advice and support social care staff use (or 
would use) when radicalisation cases emerge, and how can social care staff best 
(reactively) obtain advice and guidance (on cases likely to be rare) as and when 






Context for the research 
Updated research at this time is particularly important due to the emergence or 
recognition of newer forms of extremism to which children and young people might be 
radicalised.  For example, see evidence from the first sitting on 25 June 2020 of the 
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill, updates to the evidence base for what might be 
effective in preventing or disrupting radicalisation to extremism, the publication of 
updated Channel Duty Guidance in February 2021, and the likelihood that practice in 
identifying and working with children and young people has been necessarily altered over 
the last 12 months in light of COVID-19.  
The integral role of children’s social care in safeguarding children and young people from 
radicalisation and extremism is recognised within key statutory guidance such as 
Working Together to Safeguard Children and in the Channel Duty Guidance. As with 
other types of harm, there is widespread recognition that early intervention can reduce 
the risks posed and that a range of partners (for example, children’s social care, 
education, childcare, health, police, prisons and probation) must work in partnership to 
identify and safeguard children and young people.  This research is also being shared 
with the current Independent review of children’s social care focused on the needs, 
experiences and outcomes of the children supported by social care, and the Independent 
review of Prevent focused on the UK’s strategy for protecting people vulnerable from 
being drawn into terrorism.  
Data on referral rates into the Prevent programme shows that young people (aged 20 
years and younger) have consistently made up the majority of referrals, discussions at 
panel and Channel cases.11  In 2019/20, 54 per cent (3,423 out of 6,287) of referrals to 
Prevent were for under-20s (see Figure 1).  The data for that year also shows that 88 per 
cent (5,514) were male.  
 
11 Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme April 2019 to March 2020, April 






Figure 1: Referrals made to and discussed at a Channel panel, and adopted as a 
Channel case, by age 2019/2020.  
 
Source: Home Office, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent 
programme, England and Wales, April 2019 to March 2020. Annex A, Table 4 
 
Although the proportion of cases made up by young people have remained relatively 
stable since 2017/18, the total number of cases have fluctuated. Data for all age groups 
shows that in 2017/18, 7,318 total referrals were made to the Prevent Programme. This 
declined to 5,738 in 2018/19, before rising again by around 10 per cent to 6,287 in 
2019/20.  
The data also shows that amongst all cases the proportion of referred cases being 
deemed suitable for discussion and for adoption at Channel in recent years have 
increased.  In terms of cases discussed, the proportion rose from 18% in 2017/18 (1,314 
out of 7,318) to 23% in 2019/20 (1,424 out of 6,287). Similarly, the proportion of cases 
adopted at Channel increased from 5% in 2017/18 (394 out of 7,318 individuals referred) 
to 11% in 2019/20 (697 out of 6,287).   
The data also suggest that the proportion of referrals for concerns related to Islamist 






to 24% of referrals in 2019/20 (1,487 out of 6,287). Meanwhile referrals for individuals 
with a mixed/unclear ideologies have increased, from 38% in 2018/19 (2,169 out of 
5,738) to 51% in 2019/20 (3,203 out of 6,287).12 There has also been a smaller increase 
in the number of referrals for concerns related to Extreme Right-Wing ideologies, from 
18% in 2017/18 (1,312 out of 7,318) to 22% in 2019/20 (1,387 out of 6,287). These 
trends have been generally reflected in the proportion of cases adopted at Channel 
panel.  
Research methodology 
The research involved four main strands of qualitative consultation, taking a semi-
structured approach to focus on the specific knowledge and expertise of individual 
participants13. This was complemented by sharing and testing emerging findings with key 
stakeholders in order to use their feedback to increase accuracy, detail or nuance.  
Strand 1: Initial workshop with Prevent Education Officer sub-group 
An initial workshop was held with the Prevent Education Officers (PEOs) Children’s 
Services Sub-group.14 This was attended by six PEOs, and an interview was conducted 
with an additional member of the sub-group who was unable to attend the workshop. 
Attendees provided a detailed account of research they had been conducting within their 
own local authority areas in the preceding months to better understand current 
approaches and challenges for children’s social care in responding to radicalisation and 
extremism. Their knowledge and views also helped inform the selection of the sample of 
local authorities for inclusion in the research, shape the topics and questions on which to 
consult stakeholders, and begin to frame and contextualise later consultation responses. 
Strand 2: Local authority area case studies 
Online focus groups and 1-to-1 interviews were conducted with staff from 11 local 
authority areas between 2 November 2021 and 15 January 2021. Six of the 11 areas had 
Prevent-priority status. The sample of local authority areas was selected by the DfE 
based on a mix of areas by Prevent-priority status, by levels of experience in dealing with 
cases of radicalisation and extremism, and by geographical location.  
 
12 This category of concern was not included in the 2017/18 statistics.  
13 Topic guides were agreed in advance with DfE (see copies in the appendices). 






Each case study involved consultation with staff with greater or lesser experience of local 
structures and practice relating to children and young people at risk of radicalisation and 
extremism. In each area this included children’s social care staff working in strategic and 
senior operational roles. Where possible, it also included frontline social workers working 
directly with children, young people and families. Table 1 provides a detailed breakdown 
of the sample. For the purposes of reporting, the identities of the local authority areas 
involved in the research have been anonymised.  






















Areas with Prevent Priority Status 
A South 
East 
1 1 1 1 0 4 
B South 
East 
1 1 1 0 0 3 
C London  0 3 3 4 0 10 
D Midlands 1 0 7 1 0 9 
E London  1 2 0 3 0 6 
F North 
West 
1 1 1 1 0 4 
  
 






Areas without Prevent Priority Status 
G North 
East  
0 0 1 1 0 2 
H North 
East 
5 0 0 0 1 6 
I South 
East  
1 1 1 0 0 3 
J North 
West  
0 0 4 0 1 5 
K South 
West 
0 1 2 0 0 3 
 Totals 11 10 21 11 2 55 
 
All but one of the local authority areas with Prevent-priority status in the research were 
metropolitan districts or London Boroughs, whereas the local authority areas without 
Prevent-priority status were a mix of metropolitan districts and County Councils.  
Strand 3: Consultation with national and regional stakeholders 
Online focus groups and 1-to-1 interviews were also conducted with regional and national 
stakeholders between 2 November 2021 and 15 January 2021. Nineteen stakeholders 
were identified by DfE colleagues and colleagues from the PEO children’s services group 
for their ability to provide useful insights into this topic. All stakeholders were contacted at 
least twice, and 13 agreed to be interviewed. This included stakeholders from the 
following agencies/roles16: 
• Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) (n=5) 
• Director of Children’s Services (DCS) (n=2) 
 
16 The Directors of Children’s Services and social workers who participated in Strand 3 were based outside 
of the 11 selected case study areas. The Principal Social Worker was recruited via the Principal Social 






• Social Workers (n=2) 
• Principal Social Workers (n=1)17 
• Voluntary/community organisations with national coverage (n=2) 
• Social Work England (n=1) 
 
Strand 4: Sense testing findings 
Following the initial analysis of consultation responses, two workshops were conducted 
to seek feedback on emerging findings and add further detail and nuance where 
necessary. The first sense-testing workshop was with members of the DfE steering group 
for the research and the second was with national and regional stakeholders who had 
participated in the research.  
A written overview of emerging findings was also shared with lead contacts across all 
local authority areas who participated in the case studies and any national and regional 
stakeholders who were unable to attend the workshop but wished to contribute to the 
sense-testing process. Again, their feedback was sought and used to inform additional 
analysis of the original consultation data or to add nuance and detail to the findings.  
 
17 The Principal Social Worker Network also supported the research by circulating an invitation to 
participate to all network members. Two additional Principal Social Workers expressed interest, but they 
were unable to participate within the timescales for the research.  
Terminology 
Throughout this report, if views are expressed by people from a cross-section of 
roles from local authorities (i.e. from children’s social care, Prevent and youth 
justice), then they are referred to as ‘local authority stakeholders’.  
The term ‘children’s social care stakeholders’ is used to refer to strategic 
leads, senior operational stakeholders, team managers and frontline social 
workers and practitioners in children’s social care. Where possible, roles are 
specified in more detail.  
If views are expressed from a cross-section of national and regional 
stakeholders, then they are referred to as ‘national and regional 






Limitations of the research 
Due to the focus on a relatively small number of local authority areas, findings may not 
be representative of the current situation across the whole of the children’s social care 
sector. However, commonalities in views, practice and challenges were evident across 
the 11 local authority areas, which suggests that the findings may be a useful starting 
point to understand the national picture.  
The qualitative methodology allowed for more detailed exploration of the key topics with a 
small sample of children’s social care staff and partners in each local authority area. 
Survey methodologies might be more suited to gathering additional evidence in relation 
to specific topics discussed in this report, such as the self-reported confidence and skills 
of a larger sample of social workers. Equally, collation and analysis of children’s social 
care monitoring data on referrals and case outcomes could provide more accurate 
information about the scale of radicalisation concerns requiring or receiving a children’s 
social care response.18  
Structure of the report 
This report is structured as follows: 
• Chapter 2: Prevalence and types of cases. This chapter explores perceptions of 
the prevalence of radicalisation referrals and cases, ideologies, radicalising 
influences, and common underlying vulnerabilities of children and young people at 
risk of radicalisation and extremism.  
• Chapter 3: Processes and practices. This chapter explains the pathways into 
children’s social care, frameworks and approaches used by children’s social care in 
response to radicalisation, and multi-agency working. It also outlines any changes 
to practices over the last three to four years.   
• Chapter 4: Challenges to effective practice and potential solutions. This chapter 
outlines the key challenges to effective practice in responding to radicalisation that 
were identified through the research; information-sharing, determining and using 
thresholds, developing shared multi-agency understanding of risk and response, 
and engaging families. 
 
18 Referral data by region are available here: Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent 






• Chapter 5: Social workers’ confidence, experience and understanding. This chapter 
explores the current Prevent training offer, preferred training approaches in 
children’s social care, the most common and preferred sources of advice, and 
additional advice, support and guidance that may be needed to increase social 
workers’ confidence, skills and experience in responding to radicalisation.   
• Chapter 6: Implications for policy and practice. This chapter outlines the 
implications for policy and practice identified through this research. 
• Chapter 7: Appendices. The appendices include the topic guides used for research 
strands one to three – i.e. the initial workshop with Prevent Education Officers, 
local authority case studies, and consultation with national and regional 
stakeholders.   
Throughout this report, we have included examples of good and promising practice in 
blue text boxes, looking in detail at one aspect of processes and practices from within a 







Chapter 2: Prevalence and types of cases 
Chapter summary 
Over the past three to four years, the number of children and young people being 
referred to Prevent and/or children’s social care because of concerns about radicalisation 
has either increased or remained the same in most of the 11 local authority areas which 
are the focus of this research. Most of these local authority areas which have seen an 
increase in referrals were Prevent-priority areas, and the increase in these areas appears 
to reflect either a.) increased confidence and skills amongst referrers in identifying 
children and young people who might be at risk of radicalisation and/or b.) improved 
referral processes/better awareness of these processes. As such, it does not necessarily 
indicate that the prevalence of children and young people at risk of radicalisation has 
increased in these areas.  
Within radicalisation referrals, stakeholders identified the following trends:19 
• Ideology. Over the past three to four years there has been a reported increase in 
mixed/unclear ideologies and Extreme Right-Wing ideologies, although in many 
local authority areas Islamist extremism concerns remain the most prevalent or 
most frequently identified ideology in the area. In cases relating to mixed/unclear 
ideologies the specific ideology itself was perceived to be of less importance to 
children and young people than their broader search for belonging and/or 
explanations for their sense of not belonging; some continually switched between 
ideologies, and they did not always hold the views associated with it. This made it 
challenging to categorise the risk and develop an appropriate response to it.  
• Influencers. Online influences are an increasing concern and are particularly 
associated with radicalisation to Extreme Right-Wing and mixed/unclear ideologies. 
They have been exacerbated by parents having an insufficient understanding of 
the risks and threats linked to online platforms, and by the COVID-19 pandemic 
resulting in children and young people spending more time online.   
• Underlying vulnerabilities. Almost all children and young people referred as at 
risk of radicalisation are young men. Common underlying vulnerabilities in children 
and young people at risk of radicalisation include social isolation, limited sense of 
belonging, low confidence/self-esteem, mental health concerns, autism, other 
 






learning needs, neglect, and past trauma. These are similar to those outlined in the 
Channel Duty Guidance. 
• Links with other forms of harm. There was relatively wide recognition that 
children and young people at risk of radicalisation had similar underlying 
vulnerabilities to those at risk of being groomed into gangs. Views on whether the 
pattern of underlying vulnerabilities overlapped with other forms of harm were more 
mixed.  
Perceptions of prevalence 
Stakeholders were not in a position to comment on the number of referrals or cases 
involving radicalisation or extremism concerns as recorded by children’s social care, 
Prevent or Channel due to the qualitative nature of the consultation and not having been 
asked to prepare data on this in advance. They were, however, able to discuss their 
sense of prevalence within their local authority areas or across the local authority areas 
about which they had insight. However, it should be noted that because all stakeholders 
had some involvement in radicalisation cases, their perception of prevalence might not 
accurately reflect the true scale. 
Unsurprisingly, reported prevalence varied substantially between local areas, as did the 
extent to which prevalence has changed over the last three to four years. There were two 
main assessments of change in prevalence: 
• The number of radicalisation cases being referred to Prevent and/or children’s 
social care had not significantly changed over the past three to four years. 
• The number of cases being referred had increased. 
Some local authority areas experience ‘peaks and troughs’ in referrals, where they may 
see an increase in referrals at certain times (such as after specific terrorist incidents, or 
during periods where there are particular radicalising influencers in the area) and dips at 
other times (such as during school holidays when risks are not being picked up by school 
staff).  These spikes were also identified by national/regional stakeholders. Other areas 
(non-priority areas) reported a consistently low number of referrals.  
Where local authority areas in the study have seen an increase in referrals, this has not 
necessarily translated into a higher number of cases meeting the thresholds for either 
Prevent/Channel intervention or intervention from children’s social care. Instead, the 






referrers in identifying children and young people who might be at risk of radicalisation 
and/or improved referral processes (or better awareness of these processes by 
referrers).20 
Ideologies 
The most prevalent ideologies varied by local authority area but most areas in the study 
reported an increase over the last three to four years in referrals involving Extreme Right-
Wing ideologies and mixed/unclear ideologies. CTP stakeholders corroborated this 
viewpoint and suggested that these trends are seen both nationally and locally. As with 
overall prevalence, more referrals did not necessarily result in more cases meeting the 
threshold for children’s social care or Prevent/Channel intervention. It was also not 
possible to establish whether increased numbers of referrals indicate that more children 
and young people are at risk of radicalisation to these ideologies or that referrers are 
more aware of these ideologies and the signs that a child or young person might be at 
risk of radicalisation to them.  
In many of the local authority areas in the study these increased numbers of referrals for 
Extreme Right-Wing and mixed/unclear ideologies still constituted a smaller proportion of 
radicalisation referrals than those related to Islamist extremism concerns, which had 
historically been the most prevalent or most frequently identified ideology in the area. 
For most local authority areas and national/regional stakeholders who took part in the 
research, mixed/unclear ideologies represented the newest types of ideologies identified. 
These referred to: 
• Chaotic ideologies, where children and young people demonstrated conflicting 
viewpoints, such as a mixture of Extreme Right-Wing and Islamist extremism. 
• Unclear ideologies, such as conspiracy theories, misogynistic viewpoints, a fixation 
on school shootings, or Q-Anon.21  
In many of the example cases discussed by national, regional and local authority 
stakeholders, the specific ideology itself was not important to children and young people; 
some continually switched between ideologies, and they did not always hold the views 
associated with it. This made it challenging to categorise the risk and develop an 
appropriate response to it. In these cases especially, it made sense for professionals to 
 
20 For more information on referral rates to Prevent, please see: Individuals referred to and supported 
through the Prevent Programme, April 2019 to March 2020 






explore and address the underlying vulnerabilities of the child or young person, rather 
than the ‘ideology’ itself, especially as these vulnerabilities put them at risk of being 
radicalised into a single, more clearly-defined ideology. These underlying vulnerabilities 
are explored more in sub section: Common underlying vulnerabilities.    
Radicalising influences 
Online influences were an increasing concern in all local authority areas and for 
national/regional stakeholders. They were particularly associated with radicalisation to 
Extreme Right-Wing and mixed/unclear ideologies and were exacerbated by parents 
having an insufficient understanding of the risks and threats linked to online platforms. 
Online risks identified by consulted stakeholders included: 
• Children and young people accessing radical or extremist content online (including 
through the dark web). 
• Children and young people being groomed or radicalised through online discussion 
forums. 
• Social media platforms or online games acting as introductory spaces.  
There was also a sense that online influences had become more significant during the 
COVID-19 pandemic because children and young people were spending more time at 
home and online and because increased isolation exacerbated some of the underlying 
vulnerabilities that put children and young people at risk of radicalisation (discussed 
further in the next section: Common underlying vulnerabilities).22 
Having said this, local authorities and national/regional stakeholders in the study also 
widely recognised that face-to-face extra-familial influences in the community continue to 
act as radicalising influencers. This was particularly the case for Extreme Right-Wing 
ideologies (specifically in communities with histories of racism) and Islamist extremist 
ideologies. For example, in around half of the local authority areas consulted, increases 
in referrals relating to Extreme Right-Wing ideology coincided with international or local 
events, such as local activity by Extreme Right-Wing political parties, elections and 
referendums, and local immigration. National and regional CTP stakeholders also 
identified this trend.  
 
22 The government posted advice about keeping children safe online during Covid. For more information, 






Equally, familial influences remained important in relation to Islamist extremist and 
Extreme Right-Wing ideologies. For instance, referrals for children and young people 
were sometimes triggered by the upcoming release of a family member convicted of a 
terrorism offence (which might result in multiple referrals for children and young people in 
the same family unit). In other cases, it became apparent during assessment or ongoing 
work with a young person that family members expressed views that were extremist or 
bordering on extremism.   
Common underlying vulnerabilities 
Most local authorities and national/regional stakeholders consulted highlighted that 
almost all children and young people referred as at risk of radicalisation are young men. 
There was also a strong consensus that underlying vulnerabilities placed referred 
children and young people at greater risk of radicalisation or extremism, by affecting their 
decision-making, consequential thinking, and ability to recognise exploitation and/or 
judge social situations. Although specific vulnerabilities varied for each young person, 
common underlying vulnerabilities were: 
• Social isolation (i.e. looking for connection and struggling with social 
relationships).23 
• Limited sense of belonging (i.e. wanting to be needed, seeking a group. Distinct 
from, but often linked to, social isolation). 
• Low confidence/self-esteem. 
• Mental health concerns. 
• Autism (manifesting itself here in children and young people being more vulnerable 
to developing fixations and finding it more difficult to shift their viewpoints). 
• Other learning needs (such as communication and language difficulties, Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), or Obsessive-compulsive Disorder (OCD)). 
• Neglect. 
 
23 This was often a result of or linked to school exclusion or non-attendance, rurality, bullying, a lack of 
youth or mental health support, or a lack of friends. Local authority area stakeholders also suggested that 






• Past trauma (such as exposure to domestic abuse). 
There was relatively wide recognition that children and young people at risk of 
radicalisation had similar underlying vulnerabilities to those at risk of being groomed into 
gangs, with one local authority area identifying a recent trend whereby people who have 
been groomed into gangs are moving into extremism or vice versa. Views on whether the 







Chapter 3: Processes and practice 
Chapter summary 
The case studies showed that there are two main pathways into children’s social care for 
radicalisation referrals (with some variation within these): 
• Referral pathway 1: radicalisation concerns are identified, a referral is made to 
children’s social care, who automatically refer the case into the Prevent team or 
Channel panel. Alongside this, children’s social care screen for other safeguarding 
concerns and respond accordingly. 
• Referral pathway 2: radicalisation concerns are identified and a referral is made 
directly into the Prevent team/Channel panel. The Prevent team/Channel panel 
coordinate a multi-agency response to the referral, and if additional safeguarding 
concerns are identified will refer into children’s social care. 
This parallel response of children’s social care and Prevent/Channel enables more 
holistic, consistent and long-term responses to be implemented. In contrast to findings 
from the previous research,  the local authority and national/regional stakeholders 
consulted did not identify a need for a single referral pathway; there was generally a 
consensus that both these pathways can work well in a single local authority area.24  
In some areas, standard social care processes are used for referring, screening, and 
applying thresholds to radicalisation cases. If a case meets the threshold for children’s 
social care intervention, standard social care frameworks and approaches are also 
usually applied to address underlying vulnerabilities, with additional support from key 
partner agencies.  
Other areas, particularly those with higher prevalence of radicalisation/Prevent-priority 
areas, may use more radicalisation-specific approaches and reported that these are 
effective in enabling children’s social care to implement appropriate safeguarding 
responses. These include: 
• Radicalisation and extremism written into thresholds and assessment guidance. 
 
24 Please note that this research was not a follow-up study with the same local authorities included in the 
research conducted in 2016(Safeguarding and Radicalisation, 2017), and different methods were used. As 
such any differences in findings may indicate changes which have occurred but may also be the result of 
different processes, practices or contexts in the local authorities included in each sample or differences in 






• Close partnership working between Prevent teams and children’s social care 
during screening, assessment and ongoing support for children, young people and 
families.  
• Specialist radicalisation/extremism roles within children’s social care who may 
help with screening referrals, advising and coaching allocated social workers, and 
coordinating partnership working. 
Areas also increasingly recognise that contextual safeguarding (which is an approach to 
understanding and responding to young people’s experiences of significant harm outside 
of the home) is likely to be an effective response to radicalisation involving extra-familial 
influencers.25 There is emerging evidence of its application in some areas.  
Multi-agency working between children’s social care and partner agencies is crucial to 
effective responses. There is some evidence that this is improving, although its efficacy 
varies across local authorities and it often relies on individual relationships.  
Pathways into children’s social care 
Most common pathways 
Local authorities consulted identified two main pathways into children’s social care 
(Figure 2 and Figure 3), although there was variation in the specific pathways used in 
different areas. Both referral pathways one and two (or variations thereof) were used in 
most areas, with a children’s social care and Prevent/Channel response running parallel 




25 More information about contextual safeguarding can be found at www.csnetwork.org.uk.  
Please note that these example pathways seek to represent the main routes 
into children’s social care by amalgamating information from the 11 local 
authority areas which participated in this research. They therefore do not 
necessarily represent the detail or specifics of referral pathways in each of 
these individual local areas. They also do not outline additional work which 
might have been undertaken by key partners prior to referral to children’s social 
care, such as intelligence gathering by CTP or partnership working between 






In referral pathway 1, radicalisation concerns are identified, a referral is made to 
children’s social care via the multi-agency safeguarding hub (MASH) or ‘front door’ 
screening and assessment teams, who automatically refer the case into the Prevent 
team or Channel panel. Alongside this, children’s social care screen for other 




In referral pathway 2, radicalisation concerns are identified and a referral is made directly 
into the Prevent team/Channel panel. The Prevent team/Channel panel coordinate a 
multi-agency response to the referral, and if additional safeguarding concerns are 
identified will refer into children’s social care. (Figure 3) 
For both pathways, radicalisation concerns are identified by a range of multi-agency 
partners. These are outlined in the sub-section: Referral processes.  
  
 









Most local authority areas consulted reported that having referrals related to 
radicalisation concerns come into children’s social care via the same entry point as all 
other referrals was an effective process because it helps to embed radicalisation 
responses into the main local safeguarding processes and structures. For example, one 
stakeholder reported: 
Having a universal referral process is effective because it enables us 
to embed radicalisation responses into safeguarding and also to look 
at young people and families in the round – seeing radicalisation as 
one of a number of harms and vulnerabilities which might be 
happening or is at risk of happening. – Strategic/operational social 
care leads. 
The parallel response of children’s social care and Prevent/Channel was also viewed as 
beneficial, because it allows cases to be looked at more holistically, and for more 
consistent, longer-term responses to be implemented. It also ensures work from one 
agency is not held up due to waiting for responses from the other (although there were 
high levels of interaction and consultation between the two).  
 







The case study areas reported that the majority of referrals into children’s social care or 
the Prevent team/Channel panel come via schools and further education providers. Other 
referrers identified included: 
• Police and/or CTP. 
• Voluntary and community organisations. 
• Youth Justice services. 
Most areas use standard children’s social care referral forms to receive referrals about 
radicalisation. Some areas, however, use more radicalisation-specific approaches. These 
are used in both Prevent-priority and non-priority areas. Examples of these include: 
• Adapting universal referral forms to include specific reference to radicalisation. In 
some areas, this form includes a tick box or similar to indicate radicalisation 
concerns. 
• Using radicalisation-specific referral forms, including the National Prevent Referral 
Form. In areas taking this approach, if a referral is received via a standard referral 
form and through screening it is clear that the primary form of risk is radicalisation, 
the referrer is asked to also complete the Prevent referral form. 
Areas using these approaches suggested they were useful in supporting children’s social 
care staff to screen for radicalisation risks, as it clearly indicates where radicalisation is a 
concern (see next section: Screening). It also helps to focus the referrer’s mind on the 
reason and evidence for the referral, which can support the person screening the referral 
to pick up on the risks. One local authority area suggested that it had been particularly 
useful when referrals had not met the threshold for children’s social care, as it clearly 
indicated that a referral still needed to be sent to Prevent or Channel.  
Some local authority areas currently using universal referral forms also agreed that a 
more radicalisation-specific approach would be helpful in supporting the screening 
process. They suggested that in cases where referrals had been made directly into 
Prevent, a Prevent referral form can also help gather additional information which can be 
shared with children’s social care. They also suggested that a Prevent referral form might 
reduce the number of unnecessary referrals by supporting the referrer to think in-depth 
about the risk. Other areas, however, did not identify any problems with using the 







In the areas consulted as part of this research screening of referrals for radicalisation 
concerns generally follows one of two processes: 
• Standard children’s social care screening process. 
• Working closely with the Prevent team to screen referrals. 
In both processes, screening also involves working closely with other multi-agency 
partners (such as the referrer and multi-agency structures such as a MASH) to share 
information and data to inform the process. CTP are also consulted as part of the joint 
screening process and in cases where they are the referring agency in the standard 
screening process, but are not always routinely included in the children’s social care 
screening process.  
Standard children’s social care screening process  
In some local authority areas consulted, all or a specific few staff working in screening 
and assessment teams have been trained in spotting indicators of radicalisation, and 
therefore standard processes apply, with these ‘front door’ staff referring into Prevent or 
Channel panel if a risk was identified.  
Most case study areas using this approach reported that it worked well, with confidence 
that staff were skilled in screening for radicalisation risks. However, other areas 
expressed concern that if staff have not been sufficiently trained in spotting indicators of 
risk for radicalisation, the ‘front door’ screening and assessment team might miss the risk 
factors and not make a referral to Prevent. This was a particular concern for cases which 
do not otherwise meet the threshold for social care intervention, as the window of 
involvement with children’s social care and therefore the window for risk identification by 
children’s social care is smaller. Further research may be useful in determining the extent 
to which cases adopted by Channel have been previously referred into children’s social 
care without an onward Prevent referral being made.  
Joint screening with Prevent team 
In other areas, the ‘front door’ screening and assessment teams in children’s social care 
and the local Prevent team or coordinator work closely together to screen referrals where 
radicalisation has been identified as a concern. This joint working supports decisions to 
be taken against social care and Prevent thresholds, and is often facilitated by the use of  
radicalisation/extremism roles within children’s social care or safeguarding points of 






radicalisation has been flagged as a concern (see sub-section: Specialist roles to support 
effective practice). 
Areas using this approach tend to have a higher prevalence of cases and are Prevent-
priority areas (as they are also those which tend to have Prevent teams or coordinators) 
although there are also some Prevent-priority areas with Prevent coordinators which do 
not use this joint screening process but provide advice once a case has been allocated.  
 
Figure 4: Promising practice example - Prevent screening tool 
One local authority area described how referrers are asked to complete a Prevent 
screening tool after making a referral where radicalisation is the primary concern. This 
helps inform the screening process undertaken by children’s social care.  
This tool was developed in line with screening for child sexual exploitation (CSE) and 
other vulnerabilities. It explores risk level (high/medium/low) and is designed to elicit an 
explanation of these ratings rather than tick box responses. It is accompanied by an 
information sheet for referring organisation to support the local Notice, Check and 
Share process, and help guide initial exploratory conversations with the child or young 
person. 
Children’s social care and Prevent stakeholders in this area reported that this is an 
effective way of gathering information on referrals, because it draws upon the existing 
relationships that referrers often already have with the children and young people, and 









Figure 5: Promising practice example - Recording radicalisation concerns on 
case management systems 
 
In two case study areas, radicalisation risks had been added to the categories of need 
in case management systems to support the screening process by clearly highlighting 
where radicalisation concerns were present. In one of these areas, this coincided with 
the refresh and launch of a new threshold document in September 2020 which 
included new and emerging issues in relation to extra-familial harm, including child 
exploitation and extremism. In the other area, radicalisation risks had been represented 
in case management systems for a more prolonged period of time. In this area, there is 
also an option on the system to flag what type of ideology/extremism was a concern 
and identify possible support packages to be explored Iater on in the assessment 
stage. 
Thresholds 
This section focuses on the process of applying thresholds to radicalisation cases 
referred into children’s social care. Additional challenges associated with determining and 
using thresholds are outlined in more detail in Chapter 4: Challenges to effective practice 
and potential solutions.  
In most areas consulted, a multi-agency strategy meeting is usually convened to assess 
the risk against thresholds. In some areas this takes place after the initial screening, and 
in some local authority areas consulted it informs initial screening (see previous sub-
section: Screening). If there are no other safeguarding concerns identified during the 
screening process, this sometimes involves the Channel panel only, but the case may be 
re-referred into children’s social care if additional safeguarding concerns are identified.  
In most areas consulted, standard children’s social care threshold documents are used to 
look at the behaviours and risk factors reported on the referral form and assess the 
statutory responsibilities of children’s social care. In other areas, radicalisation and 
extremism concerns have been written into thresholds and assessment guidance over 
the last three to four years in response to challenges encountered with applying these to 
radicalisation in the past . These challenges, as well as the merits of each approach, are 
discussed further in Chapter 4: Challenges to effective practice and potential solutions. 
When cases do meet the threshold for children’s social care intervention, the level of 






case might not meet the threshold for statutory intervention but would be referred into 
family support or Early Help. Case allocation generally happens on a case-by-case basis 
and does not differ to case allocation procedures for other forms of harm. However, in 
some local authority areas specialist roles are used to support effective practice and work 
alongside the allocated social worker. This is discussed in more detail in sub-section: 
Specialist roles to support effective practice.   
Consulted local authority stakeholders were generally confident that if a referral into 
children’s social care did not meet the threshold for intervention following screening or 
assessment and had been referred into Prevent and/or Channel panel, it would be re-
referred back into children’s social care if any additional safeguarding concerns were 
identified later on. Similarly, they were confident that if cases are referred directly into 
Prevent or Channel panel, they would identify any additional safeguarding concerns and 
refer into children’s social care if needed.  
However, they also recognised the possibility that additional risks might not be picked up 
by Prevent or Channel. There may therefore be an argument for ensuring that a.) all 
Prevent referrals are screened by children’s social care at the point of referral, even 
when they are initially referred into Prevent or Channel with no additional safeguarding 
concerns, and b.) children’s social care representatives attend Channel panel as 
standard in all areas, in order to provide additional safeguarding expertise. To assess the 
benefit of this, further investigation would be needed to ascertain the extent to which 
additional safeguarding concerns are currently being picked up by Prevent or Channel. 
The impact these approaches might have on social care capacity and resources, and 
how dependent they would be on working relationships between social care and Prevent 
team/Channel, would also need consideration.  
Relationship to Prevent/Channel 
As previously discussed, in some of the local authority areas consulted there was a close 
relationship between the ‘front door’ screening and assessment teams in children’s social 
care and the local Prevent team/Channel panel. This was supported by: 
• Designated liaison roles within children’s social care and Prevent/Channel panel 
(for more detail see Chapter 4: Challenges to effective practice and potential 
solutions). 
• Channel or Prevent coordinators having a background in safeguarding, and 
therefore being skilled at identifying other vulnerabilities that might require 






• Clear and jointly agreed processes guiding partnership work between children’s 
social care and Prevent team/Channel panel. 
• Co-location of children’s social care and Prevent team in the local authority (also 
known as Dovetail sites).  
• Multi-agency strategy meetings. 
The case study areas reported that this close partnership working was important in 
supporting children’s social care staff to make a decision on how best to proceed with 
referrals where radicalisation or extremism was a concern. They also reported that 
information-sharing processes and agreements between children’s social care and 
Prevent/Channel reduce delays, support all professionals working with the family to work 
to similar timescales, and can help inform and plan next steps.  
 
Figure 6: Promising practice example - Locating Prevent and Channel within the 
local authority Chief Executive  
 
In one case study area, the lead for Prevent and Channel is located within the office of 
the Chief Executive (CE), rather than in another directorate such as children’s social 
care, community safety or adult social care. Local stakeholders in Prevent/Channel and 
children’s social care reported that this was an increasing strength of the area’s 
response to radicalisation and extremism, as it allows more of a corporate focus on the 
radicalisation agenda and prevents it from becoming diluted within other priorities in 
individual directorates. 
Local authority stakeholders also reported the effective use of an internal ‘need to 
know form’ which can be used to support information-sharing between the CE and 
service directors in children’s social care. 
Frameworks and approaches used by children’s social care 
Selecting approaches to suit individual cases 
National, regional and local authority stakeholders widely agreed that the social care 






individual child or young person, and the approach of the individual allocated social 
worker, as is the case with all children’s social care cases. They also reported that 
responses do not tend to vary based on type of influencer ideology, or method of 
radicalisation.  
Application of core social work frameworks and approaches 
Across all consulted local authority areas and partner organisations, radicalisation was 
viewed as a risk and form of harm like any other, with ideology as a secondary factor to 
the underlying vulnerabilities that often accompany radicalisation cases. It is these 
underlying vulnerabilities that require a social care response, while responding to 
ideology is viewed as more within the remit of a Channel-mediated intervention. This 
suggests that there may have been an improvement in social care staff’s understanding 
of radicalisation as a safeguarding issue over the last three to four years, as the previous 
research (Safeguarding and Radicalisation) found that this recognition was limited, 
particularly among non-priority areas. 26  
This increasing focus on underlying vulnerabilities (which are not exclusive to 
radicalisation cases and are common across all forms of harm) means that in general 
social care practitioners draw on existing social work frameworks and approaches in 
response to concerns around radicalisation and extremism, with additional support from 
key partner agencies, such as CTP or Prevent. Existing information-sharing and data-
collection processes apply, and work can be informed by existing approaches, such as 
family work, systemic work, or youth offending or desistance theory.27 28 
Most national, regional and local authority stakeholders reported that it was appropriate 
to apply core practices to cases involving risk of radicalisation. There was though also a 
sense that the reliance on more standard approaches and frameworks partly results from 
a lack of specialist interventions across the board in social care. In addition, a small 
number of stakeholders (including stakeholders from Prevent, children’s social care ‘front 
door’ screening and assessment teams, and a DCS) questioned whether there was a 
 
26 Please note that this research was not a follow-up study with the same local authorities included in  
Safeguarding and Radicalisation, and different methods were used. As such any differences in findings 
may indicate changes which have occurred but may also be the result of different processes, practices or 
contexts in the local authorities included in each sample or differences in the nature of data generated by 
the two studies. 
27 Systemic work looks at problems within the context of relationships and the wider family rather than as 
existing within an individual. 
28 Desistance theory looks at reducing recidivism and focuses on individual lives over time to understand all 






robust evidence base in support of the efficacy of applying standard social care 
approaches to radicalisation and extremism cases (see Chapter 5: Social workers’ 
confidence, experience and understanding).   
Despite a good understanding of how core social work approaches apply to radicalisation 
cases, national, regional and local authority stakeholders (including social workers) 
reported that the extent to which social workers feel confident in putting this into practice 
varies considerably both across and within local authority areas and is largely determined 
by whether individual social workers have had experience of working with radicalisation 
cases previously. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5: Social workers’ 
confidence, experience and understanding. 
Specific approaches and interventions 
For certain aspects of working with radicalisation, social care practitioners use 
radicalisation-specific approaches either in replacement or in addition to existing 
approaches. The extent to which social workers have the skills and confidence to apply 
these specific approaches is explored more in Chapter 5: Social workers’ confidence, 
experience and understanding. 
For example, when planning work, some areas use the specific assessments used for 
child criminal and/or sexual exploitation, as the risks are similar. Others use a 
radicalisation-specific assessment template, or a standard assessment template which 
includes a specific radicalisation section. These assessments might trigger a referral into 
Prevent if one has not been made already. Identification of these specific tools were less 
prominent among the stakeholders consulted in 2016 ( Safeguarding and Radicalisation) 
which may suggest that they have become more commonly used since then. However, 
due to the different samples used in each of these studies, further investigation would be 
needed to confirm this.    
There was also recognition that compared to some other forms of harm (such as neglect 
or abuse), radicalisation cases (along with other forms of exploitation and types of harm 
that often include extra-familial influences) might require slightly more of a focus on 
making time to understand and unpick children and young people’s backgrounds, 
experiences and views, on providing credible alternative viewpoints and on supporting 
caregivers to understand the risks of online activity, especially in the cases of Extreme 






Other examples of responses which were considered particularly effective in relation to 
radicalisation and extremism concerns included flexible and accessible parenting 
workshops and the use of family counsellors or therapy. 
Specialist roles to support effective practice 
As might be expected, local authority areas with Prevent-priority status were more likely 
to report the use of specialist radicalisation/extremism roles within children’s social care. 
This took the form of specialist social workers, community coordinators around 
extremism, Prevent Champions spread across different teams, or Prevent team leads 
located within the local authority alongside children’s social care (in Dovetail sites). 
Responsibilities 
In a small number of case study areas, these specialist social workers were automatically 
allocated to cases where radicalisation and extremism was the main concern. However, 
in the majority of areas they worked alongside the allocated social worker in a supportive 
role. This represents a change from the findings of Safeguarding and Radicalisation, 
where specific teams within some managed radicalisation cases rather than supporting 
allocated social workers.  
The main duties of these specialist social workers were: 
• Screening referrals: helping to screen any new referrals into social care (or into 
Prevent if a Dovetail site) for radicalisation and other safeguarding concerns. 
• Advising and coaching allocated social workers: supporting social workers who 
have cases where radicalisation is a concern. They provide advice (such as what 
work might be appropriate, organisations that could be worked with, and resources 
to draw upon) and may conduct joint visits or co-work the case. They may also 
deliver training.  
• Coordinating partnership working: acting as a single point of contact, liaising 
and sharing information with local agencies, including police officers and the 
Prevent team. They often attend multi-agency meetings (including Channel panel) 
to support this partnership working (multi-agency working is discussed in more 
detail in sub-section: Multi-agency working).   
The case study areas where these kinds of roles are in place suggested that they are 
effective in garnering buy-in from local partners and supporting multi-agency working and 






underlying vulnerabilities are picked up on during the screening process, as practitioners 
in the role are highly-skilled and experienced in identifying these. This can help inform 
decision-making about whether a case should be referred into 
Prevent/Channel/children’s social care, and support work planning and responses.  
Stakeholders from partner agencies with experience of working nationally also reported 
that specialist roles can provide some consistency of approach within individual local 
authority areas, as one person is providing the same advice and guidance to all social 
workers with radicalisation cases. It may also increase consistency across different local 
authority areas; CTP and Prevent stakeholders reported that responses to radicalisation 
and extremism in different areas is often heavily dependent on the curation of individual 
relationship between partner agencies and children’s social care. If a specialist role was 
consistently used in children’s social care and partner agencies across different local 
authorities, this consistency could be improved by reducing the reliance on informal, 
individual relationships and ensuring a consistent point of contact. 
In some areas, the specialist role covers a wider range of complex safeguarding 
alongside radicalisation, such as grooming, exploitation and missing children. In areas 
where specialist roles do not currently exist, local authority stakeholders suggested that 
linking it to exploitation in this way could be an effective use of resource. This reflects the 
overlap between responding to radicalisation and exploitation; this is discussed further in 
Chapter 5: Social workers’ confidence, experience and understanding. 
Recruitment 
In some consulted local authority areas, the specialist role had evolved organically, with a 
social worker who had experience and/or interest in radicalisation and extremism 
accessing additional training and information and evolving into a known person to go to 
for advice and support. The informality of this sort of role means there is a risk that the 
expertise is not replaced when social workers leave teams, and an inconsistent 
awareness across the local authority area of who social workers can go to for advice and 
support. This is discussed more in Chapter 5: Social workers’ confidence, experience 
and understanding. 
In contrast, in other local authority areas the role was formalised. For example, some 
social worker teams had more formal ‘Prevent Champions’ who would act as a point of 
contact for the rest of the team to seek advice and support from, and in a small number 
of areas, the role of a Prevent/radicalisation specialist social worker was advertised and 






This funded role allows a dedicated resource to focus on radicalisation and build 
relationships within and outside of children’s social care. Local authority areas with such 
a role reported that it had helped improve partnership working and resulted in more 
consistent and effective support for children, young people and families. However, this 
role has often been difficult to fill, so there is a risk that knowledge and expertise may be 
lost if post-holders move on.  
In local authority areas which didn’t have a specific radicalisation expert or role within 
children’s social care, children’s social care stakeholders expressed mixed views on 
whether it would be helpful: some felt that it would be useful to have a point of contact to 
approach for advice and support, whereas some in non-priority areas with lower 
prevalence felt this was not necessary due to the low number of cases. Some areas also 
felt that advice and support from the Prevent team was sufficient. 
Contextual safeguarding approaches 
Across most of the local authority case studies there was a recognition that existing 
contextual safeguarding approaches could be used to plan or intervene in cases 
involving radicalisation, which often involve extra-familial harm or influences. For 
example, one strategic lead in children’s social care suggested that learning from 
exploitation and grooming could be applied to radicalisation and could help inform work 
on behaviours and family relationships. This was also identified by the participants in the 
earlier research (Safeguarding and Radicalisation, 2017) 
Local authority area stakeholders and national and regional stakeholder suggested that 
learning from approaches to exploitation and grooming which could be applied to 
responding to radicalisation includes: 
• Mechanisms to support multi-agency working, such as with schools and police, to 
identify and prevent radicalisation (including data sharing and raising awareness 
for children and young people and their families). 
• Identification of the common vulnerability factors (these often overlap with 
exploitation). 
• Using a relational way of thinking about risk to support young people, and 
understanding how identity, peer-groups, home life and previous experiences 
might lead to exploitation and/or radicalisation.   
• Enforcement when criminal activity is taking place, in terms of targeting adults who 






However, as reported in 2017, there was limited evidence of this happening in practice. 
Some local authority case study areas did report having adolescent hubs or multi-agency 
teams (particularly teams which deal with missing young people or exploitation) in which 
contextual safeguarding in response to extra-familial risk and harm is more standard 
practice in response to other forms of exploitation and grooming. These teams involve a 
range of professionals and tend to look at certain at-risk groups, conducting mapping of 
contacts and sharing of intelligence. Radicalisation cases may fit well within these teams, 
although extra capacity or training may be needed.   
Other case study areas reported instances where after one young person had been 
referred into children’s social care or Prevent due to radicalisation concerns, further 
investigation revealed these views were more widespread in local education settings. 
Following this, children’s social care or Prevent worked with schools and PEOs to 
engage a wider range of children and young people in discussion about extremist views 







Figure 7: Promising practice example - Contextual safeguarding 
 
In one case study area, multi-agency meetings are held under the Multi-Agency Child 
Exploitation (MACE) arrangements. These meetings are attended by 20-25 multi-
agency partners and are split across seven districts to ensure that the detail of smaller 
areas is captured. When the arrangements were first introduced, the focus was on 
individual children and young people, their risks and behaviour. Since then, a 
contextual safeguarding approach has been added to complement the individual risk 
assessments and work.  
The focus of the meetings is understanding locations where exploitation is taking place 
and any common themes. Mapping exercises are undertaken between the victim, 
offender and location. Through this, children and young people with specific 
radicalisation vulnerabilities have been identified and referred on to appropriate 
interventions. The MACE meetings have also supported staff to identify where there 
are issues in school settings (potentially affecting more than one child or young 
person) which has resulted in the implementation of universal and prevention 
interventions, such as Police Safeguarding Liaison Officers delivering universal 
workshops. 
Multi-agency working 
Multi-agency structures supporting the work 
In each local authority area, Channel panel is the key multi-agency structure which 
supports partnership working in response to radicalisation and extremism. This offers 
access to interventions that specifically target ideology, either via Intervention Providers 
(IPs) 29 or via local community leaders and organisations. It also enables access to other 
interventions that children, young people and their families could access which 
complemented the work being done by social care, such as parenting programmes to 
raise awareness around the risk of online radicalisation and extremism. 
 
29 Intervention Providers (IPs) are Home Office-approved ideological and theological specialists who work 
with individuals to address extremist views. For more information, see: Channel and Prevent Multi-Agency 







Figure 8: Promising practice example: Children’s social care routinely attending 
Channel panel 
In some of the local authority areas consulted, children’s social care representatives 
routinely attend Channel panel meetings to share information about current social care 
involvement in cases and to help to identify cases with additional safeguarding 
concerns which should be referred into children’s social care. Where this happens, 
stakeholders recognised its value in increasing the coordination and consistency of 
social care input into cases, and providing reassurance that any additional 
safeguarding concerns will be quickly picked up and escalated to children’s social care 
if needed.  
 
Police-led partnership panels sit alongside Channel panel in some areas, and can draw 
upon other agencies, such as children’s social care, to help mitigate risks of 
radicalisation. Stakeholders from the Prevent team in one local authority area reported 
that this is useful when a family or young person has not consented to intervention from 
Channel panel, but have still been identified as in need of wider support and signposting. 
The case studies indicated that there was a range of other pre-existing multi-agency 
structures also support partnership working between key agencies involved in tackling 
radicalisation, although they are not radicalisation specific. They include:  
• Multi-agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH). Frontline workers, strategic and 
operational leads attend multi-agency panels such as MASH, alongside 
representatives from other partner agencies. In particular, CTP stakeholders 
reported that the police officer within the MASH acts as a useful bridge between 
them and children’s social care. 
• Multi-agency teams around complex and contextual safeguarding (e.g., 
missing children, or CSE team – see previous sub-section: Frameworks and 
approaches used by children’s social care for more detail).  
• Standard multi-agency strategy meetings. Strategy meetings take place within 
children’s social care to inform and plan the work with the child or young person as 
standard safeguarding practice. This meeting may form part of the process when 
assessing whether a case meets the threshold for intervention from children’s 






intervention. It may also help decide whether a case should be referred into 
Channel. Multi-agency representatives are invited to this meeting. In cases 
involving risk of radicalisation, common partners represented at this meeting 
include education, PEOs, Prevent, and police.  
 
Figure 9 Promising practice example: Children’s social care attending MAPPA 
meetings  
In some of the local authority areas consulted, children’s social care representatives 
and allocated social workers are invited to attend Multi-agency Public Protection 
Arrangement (MAPPA) meetings in cases where there has been a terror-related 
offence which the child has been associated with (for example, committed by an adult 
in the household). In these areas, stakeholders suggested that these meetings are 
useful in sharing information with children’s social care and can help provide social 
workers with more thorough understanding of the case and a much greater sense of 
the context in which social care interventions are being delivered. 
In one area where children’s social care attended MAPPA, Prevent partners are not 
invited to attend and therefore are not accessing the same information. Local authority 
stakeholders suggested that if the Prevent team were able to attend these meetings 
they could provide a wider perspective to support social workers’ decision-making. 
Efficacy of key partnerships 
Multi-agency partnership working was flagged as a strength by most consulted local 
authority area stakeholders. For example, one frontline social worker who identified 
radicalisation concerns with a young person they were already supporting said: 
It all came as such as surprise, but everyone came together, 
especially school and the police. I am fairly new to the social work 
field, but it was perfect example of multi-agency working. I always felt 
that I could approach the police and school. - Social worker 
In contrast, the participants in the previous research (Safeguarding and Radicalisation) 
flagged partnership as key challenge in handling radicalisation cases. This suggests that 
partnership working may have improved since then, although as this research used a 






and regional stakeholders reported more of a mixed picture of partnership working that 
varied significantly across different local authority areas and relied heavily on individual 
relationships, suggesting that any improvements have not occurred consistently across 
local authority areas.  
The most common and key partner organisations for children’s social care in responding 
to radicalisation and extremism identified through this research are outlined in Table 2.  
Table 2: Common and key partner organisations 
Organisation Role and partnership efficacy  
Prevent team Most national, regional and local authority stakeholders reported 
good relationships between Prevent teams and children’s social 
care; social workers felt they could approach Prevent for advice and 
resources. This relationship is particularly strong within Dovetail 
sites where the Prevent team is located within children’s social care. 
Close joint working (including through joint visits) enables different 
perspectives to be gained, supports engagement with families and 
ensures risk-assessment and safeguarding procedures take place 
simultaneously to addressing a young person’s views and 
behaviours. 




Children’s’ social care might work alongside the police during an 
investigation if they identified safeguarding concerns, and the police 
might attend children’s social care strategy meetings and share 
intelligence to support work within children’s social care and provide 
awareness of context (such as any recent critical incident or high 
risk around associates of the young person)  Most local authority 
stakeholders identified partnerships with the police, and especially 
CTP, as particularly effective and useful. However, national and 
regional stakeholders reported substantial variation between local 
authority areas in the efficacy and maturity of these partnerships.  
Education Some local authority area stakeholders reported that education 
settings often provide a route through which other interventions 
could be delivered with the young person, and that these 
connections were supported by PEOs. However, many also reported 






Organisation Role and partnership efficacy  
role in addressing radicalisation concerns. This is discussed further 
in Chapter 4: Challenges to effective practice and potential solutions 
Youth Justice 
services 
Some local authority areas reported that Channel panel/Prevent 
might refer children and young people into voluntary engagement 
with youth justice services during criminal investigations, and vice 
versa. If a youth justice worker is already known to the child or 
young person, they may take the lead on a case and deliver a 
radicalisation-specific intervention, discussing the extremist views a 
young person may hold, providing challenge, and talking through 





Community workers, such as local youth workers, can help provide 
diversionary activities for children and young people. They may have 
specific counter-narrative expertise or focus more on tackling 
underlying vulnerabilities. These tend to be identified on a case-by-
case basis and relate closely to the young person’s individual needs 
and interests. They also will often apply contextual safeguarding 




These partners can provide a greater understanding of the young 
person’s religion and support them to develop a healthier 




These services can often help tackle some of the underlying 
vulnerabilities for children and young people at risk of radicalisation, 
such as building up their self-esteem. They can also divert children 
and young people away from extremism by providing them with a 
positive focus.  
Probation Probation officers may work alongside social care if the child or 
young person has previously offended or is coming out of custody, 




For many children and young people for whom there were 
radicalisation and extremism concerns, mental health was an 






Organisation Role and partnership efficacy  
Services 
(CAMHS) 
unclear ideologies. However, many stakeholders reported long 
waiting lists for CAMHS support, with children and young people 
either not receiving support or support being outsourced to private 
agencies. 
Housing Although many stakeholders reported that housing services were 
often required for children and young people, they said that 
accommodation was limited and that housing services often did not 
see these cases as within their remit. 
 
Potential for more proactive multi-agency work 
Strategic leads and frontline practitioners suggested that the majority of multi-agency 
working currently involves reactive response to risks but that it could also be used to 
generate more proactive responses to radicalisation and extremism. For example, 
intelligence could be better shared between partners about the vulnerabilities present in 
communities which might lead to radicalisation, and more time invested in children and 
young people through youth organisations and schools to address the underlying 
vulnerabilities (such as social isolation or a limited sense of belonging) that might lead to 
radicalisation. However, they reported that increased capacity and resource would be 
needed to enable children’s social care to effectively contribute to any joint proactive 







Figure 10: Promising practice example: Proactive responses to radicalisation   
One of the consulted national and regional stakeholders described a proactive 
approach taken in their local authority area in response to radicalisation.  
Social care leads in the area identified that Islamist extremist groups had started using 
social media in a more sophisticated way to radicalise children and young people. They 
were using a mixture of pop videos, video gaming, and recruitment videos to trigger 
different responses, depending on whom they were targeting. In particular, they were 
focusing on targeting young women, encouraging them to travel to Syria. 
Children’s social care began working closely with schools in the area to develop a 
strategy of countering this grooming activity without frightening the young people to the 
point where they would feel unable to speak out about being in contact with these 
groups. They focused on encouraging and developing critical thinking skills in young 
people, working actively to create safe spaces for them to ask questions, and building 
on their existing relationships with social workers and school staff.  
Due to this prevention work taking place, one young woman who was being groomed 
by someone in Syria, and who was being encouraged to travel to Syria and become his 
wife, disclosed this to her school without the fear of getting into trouble. The school 
flagged this to children’s social care who were able to work with her parents and the 
local police to unpick the situation, maintain the girl’s placement at school, and 
safeguard her without a great deal of state intervention. The parents engaged well due 
to the trusting relationship they already had with the school. Moreover, as a result of 
the relationships children’s social care had built up though Channel panel, they were 







Chapter 4: Challenges to effective practice and 
potential solutions 
Chapter summary 
Children’s social care practitioners encounter many of the same challenges when 
responding to radicalisation as they do when responding to other forms of harm. 
Examples include high levels of staff turnover affecting retention of knowledge, or high 
caseloads limiting the amount of time available for individual children and young people 
and their families. However, both local authority area stakeholders and national/regional 
stakeholders identified four key challenges that were specific to or exacerbated in cases 
where radicalisation was a concern: 
• Information-sharing. 
• Determining and using thresholds. 
• Developing shared multi-agency understanding of risk and appropriate response. 
• Engaging families. 
These challenges have led to inconsistency in the application of agreed processes in 
response to radicalisation and extremism, both within and across different local authority 
areas. This inconsistency can be a barrier for national and regional stakeholders to work 
effectively across and within multiple local authority areas.  
All of these challenges are common across different types of radicalisation, ideology and 
harmful influencer, and have remained consistent for a number of years; they were all 
highlighted in the previous research report Safeguarding and Radicalisation, 2017. They 
were also common across Prevent-priority and non-priority areas.  
However, one important change from the 2017 research report is that social care staff 
from local authorities consulted in this study reported that in general there is a better 
recognition of radicalisation as a form of harm requiring a safeguarding response.30  
 
30 Please note that this research was not a follow-up study with the same local authorities included in  
Safeguarding and Radicalisation, and different methods were used. As such any differences in findings 
may indicate changes which have occurred but may also be the result of different processes, practices or 
contexts in the local authorities included in each sample or differences in the nature of data generated by 






Moreover, stakeholders identified a range of possible solutions to these challenges, 
including new solutions which had not previously been identified in the previous study. 
Some of these solutions have already been implemented and have been reportedly 
successful in overcoming some of the common barriers social care practitioners face 
when responding to radicalisation.  
The key challenges and potential solutions for information-sharing, using thresholds, 
developing shared multi-agency understanding of risk, and engaging families are set out 
in Table 3 - Table 6 below and are discussed in more detail in the rest of the chapter. 
 
Information sharing 
Table 3: Information sharing - challenges and potential solutions 
Challenges 
A key barrier to effective responses to radicalisation, as experienced by children’s social 
care practitioners, is information-sharing between partners and, in particular, from police 
to children’s social care. This echoes the views of participants in the previous research 
Safeguarding and Radicalisation (2017). However, there was some evidence that 
information sharing has improved in recent years, and CTP stakeholders indicated that 
understanding has increased within the police of the ways in which sharing additional 
Challenges Potential solutions 
Information-sharing between partners, 
and, in particular, from police to children’s 
social care. 
• Designated safeguarding roles in 
partner agencies. 
• Institutional and strategic buy-in to 
the Prevent agenda. 
Please note that this chapter focuses mainly on outlining the key challenges in a social 
care response to radicalisation and the possible solutions identified. Some of these 
challenges may link to social workers’ confidence, experience and understanding, and 
may be addressed through changes to the training and support offered to them. 
Where there is a link this has been highlighted, but a more detailed exploration of 







information can be paramount to effective safeguarding responses by children’s social 
care.    
Having said this, children’s social care stakeholders still reported that although some 
information is shared from police to inform risk assessment and safety planning, this 
information is not always received as early or in as much detail as required with regards 
to the nature of the concern. CTP stakeholders and children’s social care stakeholders 
reported that this is usually because an investigation is ongoing, and so police may not 
be able to share information due to the risk of disruption to investigations or because 
children’s social care staff do not meet the security clearance threshold required by 
police partners.  
Children’s social care stakeholders suggested that a lack of detailed information affects 
the quality and extent of risk assessment and planning, especially in cases where 
radicalisation is the only form of harm and social workers are unable to judge how to 
support the family in relation to their radicalisation-specific needs. In some instances, it 
also compromises social workers’ abilities to be open and honest with families about the 
reason they have been referred to children’s social care, which can have a negative 
impact on families’ engagement.  
Whilst children’s social care stakeholders generally recognised the importance of not 
jeopardising active police investigations, a team manager explained that these 
information-sharing challenges can limit social workers’ buy-in to the Prevent agenda 
because they feel that the (necessary) secrecy surrounding some Prevent cases goes 
against their code of conduct in terms of being open with the families. This is discussed 
further in sub-section: Engaging families. 
Potential solutions 
Safeguarding roles in police or CTP, and designated points of contact for radicalisation 
cases within children’s social care, have been helpful in supporting information-sharing 
between police and children’s social care. Local authority area stakeholders suggested 
that this is because police colleagues can share information with a single known and 
designated person on a need-to-know and small-scale basis, thus not compromising 
investigations to the same extent as might happen if information was shared more widely.  
In some consulted local authority areas with a specialist radicalisation social worker or 
Dovetail Prevent coordinator, it was natural for them to take on this point of contact role. 
However, the role acting as designated point of contact does not necessarily have to be 






in senior roles with decision-making power in their own organisation. For example, it was 
reported in some areas that police officers in the MASH often have contacts with 
managers in children’s social care with whom they can share information during or prior 
to a referral.  
In many instances, current solutions to information-sharing challenges rely heavily on 
relationships between individuals within children’s social care and the police. This echoes 
the findings from Safeguarding and Radicalisation. Local authority and national/regional 
stakeholders emphasised that this is a partial solution but one that becomes more 
sustainable if these relationships enable improved information-sharing channels and 
processes to become more embedded within both organisations. As a result, institutional 
and strategic buy in from senior local authority leadership into the Prevent agenda is 
considered to be critical in driving the necessary changes to processes and practice in 
relation to information sharing.  
 
Figure 11: Promising practice example: Seconded social workers in CTP 
In one case study area the police counter-terrorism unit is planning to second a social 
worker into the team. This social worker would continue to work in the local authority 
for four days a week but would work within the police team for one day a week. They 
would receive security clearance and therefore be able to receive and share 
information with the police, reducing the risk of information being shared more widely 
when this is inappropriate. 
In addition to acting as a point of contact through whom police could share information 
with children’s social care, the intention is that this social worker will inform police 
discussions about individual cases and shed light on the roles and responsibilities of 
children’s social care, and the legislation and practices they use. This could help the 






Determining and using thresholds 
Table 4: Determining and using thresholds – challenges and potential solutions 
Challenges Potential solutions 
Radicalisation and extremism does not 
easily fit into existing thresholds used by 
children’s social care. 
• Formalising radicalisation within 
thresholds. 
• Further training on how 
radicalisation can fit into existing 
thresholds. 
Different thresholds are used by different 
partnership organisations and local 
authority areas. 
• Ensuring that any formalising of 
radicalisation within children’s social 
care thresholds aligns with 
thresholds used by partner 
organisations. 
• Sharing threshold documents 
across partner organisations. 
• Joint visits with partner 
organisations. 
Radicalisation not sitting neatly within children’s social care 
thresholds or pathways 
Challenges 
A second key challenge for children’s social care responses to radicalisation is that it can 
be difficult to use existing social care thresholds to understand, assess, and respond to 
the risk of radicalisation and extremism. Linked to this, frontline social care staff reported 
that there is insufficient guidance or legislation to guide their practice in this area.  
The difficulty in using thresholds in response to radicalisation cases was also identified in 
the previous research.. Previously though, this was linked to the fact that there was a 
lack of consensus about the degree of risk posed by radicalisation. This updated 






that radicalisation is a safeguarding risk, this has not necessarily translated into changes 
in threshold documents, which is why this challenge has persisted. 
Local authority area stakeholders we spoke to reported that existing thresholds focus on 
intra-familial harm whereas the risk of radicalisation is more likely to come from outside of 
the family. In addition, other significant forms of harm, such as abuse or neglect, may not 
be present in cases where radicalisation and extremism is the main concern. In these 
cases, it can be difficult to determine the most appropriate social care response and to 
maintain social care involvement in the case. CTP stakeholders reported that this is 
especially frustrating when a case meets their own internal safeguarding thresholds but 
does not qualify for intervention from children’s social care. 
Many local authority area stakeholders noted that there is now greater recognition among 
frontline social workers and managers that radicalisation requires a safeguarding 
response, and that existing structures and thresholds can and should be used flexibly to 
support children and young people at risk of radicalisation and address their underlying 
vulnerabilities. This represents a distinct change from the earlier research Safeguarding 
and Radicalisation, which found that this recognition was particularly inconsistent in non-
priority areas. 
However, there was also wide recognition that the extent to which this currently happens 
is heavily dependent on individual social worker’s confidence, experience and skills, and 
on the support available to them to use thresholds flexibly. For example, CTP 
stakeholders reported: 
For identification and response, judgments are to some extent 
subjective and people are not confident to assess their view when 
they don’t feel backed up by thresholds. – CTP stakeholders 
This is discussed further in Chapter 5: Social workers’ confidence, experience and 
understanding.  
Potential solutions 
A small number of local authority areas that took part in the study have written 
radicalisation into their thresholds and related guidance, or plan to do so in the future. In 
one area this change happened as part of a culture shift in recognising radicalisation and 
extremism as a child protection issue, and in another it happened in response to 
identifying that social care staff needed more guidance to help screen and assess 






There was no consensus amongst local authority area stakeholders in other areas on 
whether formalising radicalisation within social care thresholds would improve responses 
to radicalisation as a form of harm. Some suggested it would be helpful, but others saw it 
as unnecessary and pointed to the fact that children’s social care has demonstrated its 
ability to address a range of extra-familial harms and risks (such as county lines and 
gangs) that do not sit neatly within the Children’s Act or existing thresholds, which tend to 
focus on responding to parental capacity.  Moreover, in some of the local authority areas 
where radicalisation had already been formalised into threshold documents, stakeholders 
reported that there remained a limited awareness among social workers of how to use 
this guidance in relation to radicalisation concerns, and in particular the indicators to look 
for. This is discussed further in Chapter 5: Social workers’ confidence, experience and 
understanding. 
 
Figure 12: Promising practice example: Including radicalisation in threshold 
documents 
In one case study area, the children’s social care threshold document was refreshed in 
September 2020 to include new and emerging issues in relation to extra-familial harm, 
including extremism concerns.  
This refresh occurred in response to a recognition that children’s social care needed to 
provide guidance for professionals who were worried about children, and a guide as to 
the level of service the child may need. Social care staff had also identified that triage 
workers assessing and reviewing referrals that come into children’s social care where 
radicalisation and extremism is a concern would benefit from additional guidance 
around the right service for the whole family to move the referral into.  
The new threshold document is also used to help guide the Channel Panel; if they 
identify that the risk level for a child or young person on their caseload is increasing, 
they can use the document to assess this risk and escalate to children’s social care if 
needed.  
 
An alternative option would be further training and guidance for social workers on how 
radicalisation can meet the threshold for intervention even when parental capacity is not 
compromised, in a similar way to contextual safeguarding approaches. This could include 






cause to help increase understanding of why a social care response is needed. This is 
discussed further in Chapter 5: Social workers’ confidence, experience and 
understanding. 
Differing thresholds across partner organisations and local authorities  
Challenges 
Different thresholds and tolerance of risk exist across different organisations, with key 
differences between police, Prevent and children’s social care. This challenge is not 
necessarily specific to radicalisation cases but can be compounded if radicalisation is the 
main risk of harm to a young person. Differences likely result from different organisational 
purposes and priorities. For example, the police may have a lower threshold for 
intervention because they are focused primarily on eliminating the risk of terrorism 
involvement to a young person, or the risk they may pose to others through potential 
terrorist activity. On the other hand, the focus in children’s social care is more around 
amplifying the interests of the whole individual, which may require a different response 
and tolerance of higher levels of managed risk. Both are trying to achieve positive 
outcomes for the individual, but there is a slightly different focus on the risk versus the 
individual.  
National and regional stakeholders working across multiple local authority areas also 
suggested that thresholds and how they are applied to radicalisation vary significantly 
across different local authorities. This makes it difficult for partner organisations to 
implement a consistent approach to partnership working and safeguarding. This 
challenge relates to variations specifically in how thresholds are applied to radicalisation 
cases but is also part of a wider issues in consistently applying children’s social care 
thresholds to extra-familial harm.  
These differences in thresholds and risk tolerance lead to two specific challenges: 
• It is difficult to assess and agree risk, and decide on actions. There may be 
disagreement about whether a case should be taken on by children’s social care or 
other organisations, with police and education in particular often expecting a higher 
level of involvement from children’s social care. For example, partner organisations 
often expect young people referred due to radicalisation concerns to be placed on 
Child in Need or Child Protection plans, but the case may not meet the social care 
threshold for this type of support.  This challenge was also highlighted in the 
previous report (Safeguarding and Radicalisation, 2017), suggesting that it has not 






• It can lead to responses from some organisations which undermine or are 
incongruous with the priorities and actions of other organisations. This was a 
common challenge highlighted across many of the local authority areas consulted. 
One example highlighted was schools assessing children and young people as not 
safe to attend school with the mainstream cohort, resulting in exclusion. Because a 
key underlying vulnerability for children and young people at risk of radicalisation is 
often social isolation or a limited sense of belonging, social care and youth justice 
staff felt that this exacerbates the risk of radicalisation. Another example was police 
taking away electronic devices to reduce the risk of children and young people 
accessing radicalising material, but which conversely increases their sense of 
social isolation and can negatively affect their mental health (and increase their 
vulnerability to radicalisation).  
Potential solutions 
If radicalisation is formalised with children’s social care thresholds, ensuring this aligns 
with thresholds used by partner organisations and is consistent across different local 
authorities will help support understanding among partner organisations. For example, 
vulnerability to radicalisation as a form of safeguarding was adopted as a core discipline 
of public protection by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Public Protection Board 
and CTP in October 2020 following recommendations from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) report Counter-terrorism policing: 
an inspection of the police’s contribution to the government’s Prevent Programme in 
March 2020. The National Health Service also adopted it as part of contextual 
safeguarding. If children’s social care were to also include this, it may improve the 
consistency and cohesiveness of response across partner organisations and across the 
country. Consideration would, however, be needed around how to implement this top-
down across children’s social care.   
In some consulted local authority areas, sharing threshold documents and conducting 
joint visits with partner agencies (in particular with police and Prevent team colleagues) 
has also helped to increase understanding between partners of the different thresholds 
professionals are working towards, which has supported partnership working. Again, this 
may be helpful for partners who may work across multiple local authority areas to help 






Developing shared multi-agency understanding of risk and 
appropriate response 
Table 5: Developing shared multi-agency understanding of risk and appropriate 
response – challenges and potential solutions 
Challenges Potential solutions 
Different views among partner 
organisations and children’s social care on 
who should lead on radicalisation cases. 
Less understanding in Prevent teams of 
how CSE and CCE link to radicalisation. 
Different timescales within police and 
social care. 
Limited understanding by some social 
workers of the role of social care in 
responding to radicalisation. 
Education professionals may skip the 
internal response phase to radicalisation 
concerns.31 
• Joint working with partner 
organisations. 
• Increased multi-agency training. 
• Closer communication between 
partners. 
• Sharing safeguarding strategies 
across partner organisations. 
• Dovetail sites. 
• Encouraging buy-in to the Prevent 
agenda from senior colleagues and 
frontline practitioners. 
• Increased training about how 
children’s social care can respond to 
radicalisation. 
Challenges 
Differences in perceptions of risk and the appropriate responses can lead to difficulties in 
determining a shared response to radicalisation and agreeing the lead organisation for 
cases. Partner organisations often believe that children’s social care is best placed to 
lead on cases because of social workers’ ability to build and maintain relationships with 
children, young people and families and because they can manage risk using a statutory 
framework. Stakeholders working in partner organisations reported that children’s social 
care practitioners across the country do not always perceive a role for children’s social 
care and that this relates to limited understanding of the ways in which radicalisation is a 
 






safeguarding risk. It should be noted that the consulted local authority stakeholders 
disagreed with this, suggesting that there may be a greater recognition among children’s 
social care staff in their areas as opposed to others in the country that radicalisation 
requires a safeguarding response.  
Conversely, children’s social care stakeholders maintained that in many cases – and 
especially those in which radicalisation is the primary or only risk of harm – partners with 
an existing relationship with children, young people and families (such as education 
settings) or with specialism in radicalisation (such as Prevent teams) are in the best 
position to lead and social care involvement might not be necessary or appropriate. In 
particular, some local authority area stakeholders suggested that education partners 
should play a greater role in responding to radicalisation, in both cases which do not 
meet the threshold for social care intervention and cases which do. In many local 
authority areas, stakeholders reported that education partners are often reluctant to take 
on the lead professional role or to offer other supporting work with the child (for example, 
sessions on digital resilience), perceiving it as more within the remit of children’s social 
care. This may be due to the perceived high risk that these children and young people 
pose to other children and young people under their care.  
Further challenges related to differences in understanding and practice between partner 
organisations of how to respond to radicalisation include: 
• Prevent teams potentially having less understanding of how CSE and CCE link to 
radicalisation, and especially the indicators of grooming which can also apply to 
radicalisation risk (see previous sub section: Contextual safeguarding approaches 
for more information). 
• Police and children’s social care sometimes working to different timescales, with 
social workers wishing to conduct home visits more quickly whilst police colleagues 
wish to gather more intelligence before making a home visit.  
• Education professionals skipping the internal response phase to radicalisation 
concerns (such as speaking to the young person and/or their family), and referring 
straight into Prevent or children’s social care for further investigation. This was also 
identified as a challenge in the previous research report, suggesting limited 







To develop a shared multi-agency understanding of radicalisation risks and the 
appropriate response, partner organisations need to have an increased understanding of 
each other’s roles, responsibilities, priorities and viewpoints. Several methods were 
identified that could be used to achieve this that had not been previously identified in 
Safeguarding and Radicalisation. These include: 
• Joint working with partner agencies, such as children’s social care conducting joint 
visits with police and/or Prevent team, the Prevent team and police sitting in on 
children’s social care strategy meetings, or children’s social care conducting school 
visits. This helps develop trust between organisations, a shared understanding of 
priorities and approaches, and a culture of learning from partners. 
• Increased multi-agency training, such as Prevent teams conducting additional 
training with designated safeguarding leads (DSLs) in schools around the specific 
response they should take to concerns (rather than broader awareness-raising). 
This is discussed further in Chapter 5: Social workers’ confidence, experience and 
understanding 
• Closer communication between partners through multi-agency meetings and the 
use of specialist roles across partner organisations to act as points of contact and 
conduits for joint working (see Chapter 3: Processes and practice). 
• Sharing safeguarding strategies across different partner organisations. 
Although there was evidence that children’s social care increasingly recognises 
radicalisation as a form of harm requiring a safeguarding response, many local authority 
and national/regional stakeholders suggested that social workers’ understanding of their 
own role in responding to radicalisation could improve further. They suggested this can 
be achieved through: 
• Dovetail sites, where Prevent sits within the local authority rather than the police. 
This helps to tackle the historical perception of the Prevent agenda as justice-
focused rather than as a form of safeguarding. 
• Encouraging buy-in to the Prevent agenda from senior colleagues and frontline 
practitioners in children’s social care. This could help improve the consistency and 
efficacy of social workers’ responses to radicalisation both within and across local 
authority areas. Buy-in could be encouraged through the use of specialist roles 






information-sharing from partner organisations (see sub-section: Information 
sharing), community-engagement (see sub-section Engaging families), or 
Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) training (see sub-section 
Current training offer). 
• Increased training for social workers (discussed further in Chapter 5: Social 
workers’ confidence, experience and understanding). 
Engaging families 
Table 6: Engaging families – challenges and potential solutions 
Challenges Potential solutions 
Engaging families with professionals is a 
challenge for all types of harm, but it can 
be particularly difficult where there are 
concerns related to radicalisation. 
• Joint visits with partner 
organisations. 
• Having a wide range of multi-agency 
partners involved in Prevent work. 
• Consistency of worker. 
• Community engagement. 
• Community-based partners or 
police-led multi-agency panels. 
Challenges 
Engaging families with professionals is a challenge for all types of harm, but it can be 
particularly difficult where there are concerns related to radicalisation. Children’s social 
care stakeholders suggested this was because the police are often involved with 
radicalisation cases, which can be concerning for families as they are worried about their 
child being arrested. This can result in difficulties obtaining consent.   
Although engaging families was also identified as a barrier in responding to radicalisation 
cases in Safeguarding and Radicalisation, the participants in that study linked this to a 
mistrust of child protection professionals rather than of the police. It is not possible to say, 
however whether this represents a change in community perception due to the different 






Our research found that families’ reluctance to engage is compounded by the following 
factors: 
• Perception of radicalisation. Radicalisation is an emotive topic that is often in the 
media, which makes it difficult for families to openly seek and engage with support. 
There is also a fear that their safety could be compromised if the community 
becomes aware that they are working with agencies because of a concern about 
radicalisation. 
• Voluntary nature of Channel. As Channel intervention is voluntary, families’ 
anxiety around police involvement can be a particular barrier to engagement. There 
then becomes a challenge around how partners can work with children and young 
people whose families have not consented to Channel.  
• Covid-19 pandemic. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic and subsequent restrictions, 
direct work with families, children and young people has been limited or largely 
moved online. Generally, stakeholders reported that people are less likely to 
engage when it is not face-to-face. 
• Intra-familial radicalisation. Families are less likely to engage with children’s 
social care around radicalisation concerns if the risk has come from inside the 
family. This was also found to be a key barrier to family engagement in 
Safeguarding and Radicalisation, suggesting it is a persistent challenge.  
• A lack of information-sharing from police to social care. This limits the extent 
to which social workers can be open and honest with families (see sub section: 
Information sharing). 
Stigma or misunderstanding around involvement with children’s social care can also be a 
particular barrier to engagement for families from communities or demographic groups 
who are less accustomed to children’s social care involvement, or where radicalisation is 
the only safeguarding concern. Again, this aligns with the findings of Safeguarding and 
Radicalisation, suggesting that this challenge may have persisted over the last three-four 
years.  
Potential solutions 
There are five main solutions to addressing barriers to engagement with families, which 







• Joint visits with partner organisations. In some consulted local authority areas, 
children’s social care staff are approaching families alongside the Channel 
coordinator or the police. They reported that this has led to improved uptake of 
voluntary Channel support. This may be because it can help mitigate some of the 
anxiety families may have about engaging with police while still drawing on the 
expertise and skills of police to understand risks and threats. It can be particularly 
effective in cases where the family already have an allocated social worker, as 
families are more likely to engage with professionals with whom they already have 
a relationship. 
• Having a wide range of multi-agency partners involved in Prevent work. A 
wide pool of professionals who are confident and skilled in addressing 
radicalisation means a higher chance of finding someone who is best placed to 
engage with the family as a key worker and build up trust. For example, a number 
of local authority stakeholders identified youth offending practitioners as being 
particularly skilled in engaging families in relation to Prevent work. 
• Consistency of worker. Consistency of worker is important in building trust and 
engaging families with both Channel and social care work. A consistent worker is 
also better able to assess risk in the context of the family setting, to get to know the 
child or young person and to support them to share their views. They can then 
provide counter-viewpoints and start to address ideologies as well as underlying 
vulnerabilities.   
• Community-based partners or police-led multi-agency panels. CTP 
stakeholders identified community-based partners and police-led multi-agency 
panels as important options in cases where children, young people and their 
families did not consent to Channel intervention but did not meet thresholds for 
statutory involvement from other organisations.  
• Community engagement. Engaging with the community and ensuring that 
radicalisation concerns are framed as a risk posed to local communities rather than 
within local communities is important in tackling mistrust of children’s social care 







Figure 13: Promising practice example: Use of Youth Justice Service workers 
In one area, a young person who had been identified as at risk of radicalisation as a 
result of online activity was subject to an ongoing police investigation and was being 
managed via the Channel panel. The young person came from a family in which there 
were no other forms of abuse or neglect. The family had previously declined to engage 
with Early Help services and the young person was then allocated a lead worker from 
the youth offending service (YOS) with the offer of engaging on a voluntary basis. This 
support option is offered more widely to young people who are under investigation for 
other types of offence, so offering it to this young person was an extension of a 
process already in use in the area. The YOS worker was able to engage and build trust 
with the young person and family via consistent weekly visits. This meant that they 
were able to assess ongoing risks within the family context, create opportunities to 
discuss and challenge the young person’s views, and build the family’s understanding 
of the risks represented by online influencers. Updates on risk and engagement were 
shared with partners via Channel, which enabled them to assess any risk posed to or 








Figure 14: Promising practice example: Community engagement 
In one area, mistrust of the Prevent agenda in the community was a key issue. In 
response, a community engagement officer role and a Prevent Advisory Group (PAG) 
were created to enable joined up working and build up trust between the Prevent 
agenda, children’s social care and the community.  
The community engagement officer was employed as part of the Prevent team and 
was an officer seconded from the police. They linked with mosques, churches and 
charitable organisations to build up trust between the Prevent team and the 
community, and to monitor any tensions in the area. They attended Channel panel, 
sharing community-level feedback with partner organisations. The community 
engagement officer also trained community-members around processes for responding 
to radicalisation, including information about referral processes and the role of 
children’s social care. They worked alongside the local authority’s Prevent senior social 
worker who fed a social care perspective into this training.  
The PAG is attended and led by community members. They discuss radicalisation and 
extremism issues within the community, any incidents of hate crime, and any emerging 
concerns. The group has become a forum for sharing knowledge about the kinds of 
cases coming though children’s social care and social care’s processes and priorities 
in responding to radicalisation. The PAG has reportedly been successful in raising 
community awareness of Prevent, increasing understanding of the referral process to 
follow if safeguarding and/or radicalisation concerns are identified in the community, 







Chapter 5: Social workers’ confidence, experience and 
understanding 
Chapter Summary  
Social workers have access to a range of mandatory and optional training opportunities. 
However, the preferred way to access support, advice and guidance is to learn from 
those with more experience of working in radicalisation cases. This learning can happen 
through a range of formats, such as colleagues in specialist roles disseminating wider 
training and advice, or multi-agency partners sharing good practice at a regional or 
national level. 
Individual social workers’ confidence and skills in addressing radicalisation concerns 
varies substantially. It appears to be mostly determined by their experience of cases, 
their wider-ranging social work experience, and their understanding of how to apply core 
processes and approaches in different contexts. This corroborates with the findings from  
Safeguarding and Radicalisation, which also highlighted experience as a key driver for 
social workers’ confidence and skills. As radicalisation cases generally make up a small 
percentage of social workers’ overall caseload, their confidence in addressing these 
concerns is often lower than confidence in addressing other forms of harm. 
Additional support, advice and guidance could help increase social workers confidence, 
understanding and skills in the following key areas:  
• Identification of radicalisation. 
• Understanding and confidence to address radicalisation (including awareness and 
availability of evidence-based tools and interventions). 
• Type of ideology or harmful influencer. 
• Taking a contextual safeguarding approach in response to radicalisation. 










Current training offer 
All local authority areas offer mandatory Prevent training. There was consensus that this 
training had improved over recent years; social workers suggested that it previously 
focused more on Islamist extremism, and could therefore be perceived as unfairly 
targeting people from minority ethnic backgrounds. Now though, they reported it is more 
balanced across a range of different ideologies and radicalising influencers, and is helpful 
in supporting new staff to: 
• Identify radicalisation indicators. 
• Understand the processes to follow if radicalisation concerns are identified and 
who to go to for support. 
• Understand the importance of responding as early as possible.  
Please note that some of the challenges identified in relation to social workers’ 
confidence, experience and understanding link to wider challenges to effective 
practice. Some of the suggestions for additional training explored in this chapter 
may also address some of these wider challenges. Where there is a link this has 
been highlighted, but a more detailed exploration of challenges and possible 
solutions is available in in Chapter 4: Challenges to effective practice and potential 
solutions 
Point of interest 
Social workers’ confidence, experience and understanding of responding to 
radicalisation is also greatly impacted by the wider conditions of children’s social 
care, such as high staff turnover and increasing caseloads. These external factors 
may restrict social workers’ capacity to access and take on board new learning, and 
also mean that more detailed knowledge or confidence gained by individual social 
workers is lost from teams if they leave. As this is not an issue specific to 
radicalisation cases, it has not been addressed in detail in this report. However, it 






Although this training is offered across all local authority areas, it is not consistently 
accessed, resulting in some gaps in knowledge. Increased monitoring of uptake may 
therefore be useful in ensuring that all social workers are trained in Prevent.  
Social care practitioners do not widely access ‘top-up’ or additional Prevent training. 
However, in many areas designated colleagues with specialist Prevent or radicalisation 
roles or more senior managers access this training and disseminate any learning to the 
rest of the team as and when cases arise. There was a general consensus that this is an 
effective use of limited time and resource in children’s social care and is a favoured way 
to provide support and information. This is discussed more in sub-section: Common and 
preferred sources of advice, support and guidance.  
Having said this, in some local authority areas consulted, WRAP training has been more 
widely accessed by social workers.32 One national stakeholder reported that this training 
has resulted in an improvement in social workers’ awareness of Prevent, police 
thresholds, the threat picture locally, policies, practices, vulnerabilities to radicalisation, 
and different ideologies. It can also increase buy-in to Prevent by framing it as a non-
judgmental, safeguarding response. However, the previous research Safeguarding and 
Radicalisation reported that some participants perceived WRAP as unsatisfactory and 
out of date. Further investigation would therefore be needed to ascertain the extent to 
which social workers find this training useful.  
Some local authority areas also offer newly qualified social workers the opportunity to 
shadow the children’s social care representative who attends Channel panel. Local 
authority stakeholders reported that this has given these social workers a better 
understanding of the social worker role in Channel, increased their knowledge of how to 
respond to radicalisation cases, and enabled them to begin to build relationships with 
partner organisations. 
Preferred training approaches 
The format of mandatory and optional Prevent training varied across different local 
authority areas but there was agreement that the following approaches are most effective 
in teaching social workers about radicalisation: 
 
32 WRAP training is part of the Home Office training offer. It aims to give participants an understanding of 
the Prevent strategy and their role within it, the ability to use expertise and professional judgement to 
recognise vulnerable individuals who may support, and information about local safeguarding and referral 






• Multi-professional training. Training is best delivered and accessed across 
multiple professions, because it enables relationship-building and supports partner 
organisations to understand each other’s thresholds and approaches (see Chapter 
4: Challenges to effective practice and potential solutions). However, this needs to 
be balanced with a focus on how the training can be applied to social care practice 
specifically, particularly around risk factors and how radicalisation is a form of 
harm. It is most effective if this relates closely to the most common radicalisation 
influencers and ideologies in the local authority area.  
• Real-life examples. Children’s social care stakeholders agreed that the best 
training uses real-life, local examples. This increases understanding that 
radicalisation can and does occur locally, and supports social workers to apply 
their learning in practice. For example, one social worker said: 
Prevent training last year was very effective because it was real life 
examples and real evidence of real people…That makes you more 
aware…It tends to stick with you more when you relate to what’s 
being said. – Social worker 
• Face-to-face training. It is important to include face-to-face training in 
combination with e-learning modules. Social workers are generally less confident 
in working with radicalisation than with other forms of harm, and they therefore 
need to ask more questions, challenge each other’s views, and explore things in 
more depth. This is easier to do in a face-to-face context. The provision of face-to-
face Prevent training alongside e-learning is an optional recommendation in the 







Figure 15: Promising practice example: Joint Prevent and social care training  
At Channel panel in one local authority area, partners identified that social workers who 
attended Channel panel did not feel confident around partners or sure of the 
knowledge and expertise they could contribute to radicalisation cases. In response, the 
Prevent team decided to deliver additional training in partnership with a senior 
practitioner in children’s social care who specialised in radicalisation and safeguarding.  
The training focused on framing the basic principles and approaches of the Prevent 
agenda in social care language. For example, they explained how the Prevent team is 
similar to an Early Help pathfinder, and Channel panel is similar to a Child in Need 
strategy meeting. It also gave social workers advice and guidance around practical 
direct work they could do with children and young people at risk of radicalisation, 
including examples of questions to ask them and their families.  
The purpose of this training was to improve partnership working and enable social 
workers to begin building professional relationships with the Prevent team. It also 
aimed to increase social workers’ confidence in addressing radicalisation by explaining 
how it links to existing work and processes and providing some practical guidance. 
Stakeholders reported that as a result of the training they started to see better 
attendance at Channel panel from social workers and managers. 
Common and preferred sources of advice, support and 
guidance 
As previously mentioned, most social care practitioners prefer to access advice, support 
and guidance related to radicalisation on a need-to-know basis, as and when cases 
arise. This is because it is not perceived to be an efficient use of social workers’ time to 
access in-depth guidance on radicalisation when this forms such a small part of their 
workload, especially in the context of ongoing capacity and workload issues.  
Many social workers prefer to access this support through a designated point of contact 
(see Chapter 4: Challenges to effective practice and potential solutions). These 
professionals often access additional Prevent training to provide advice and guidance to 
their colleagues. This approach reduces reliance on colleagues who may simply have 
worked on radicalisation cases previously, and therefore mitigates the risk of such 
knowledge being lost as a result of high staff turnover or staff moving teams. It also can 






However, some national and regional stakeholders reported that advice and guidance 
from designated points of contact do not always reach all social workers with 
radicalisation cases, particularly in non-priority areas with lower prevalence of cases. 
This suggests that in areas which have adopted this model, more work may be needed to 
signpost social workers to the designated point of contact for radicalisation.  
Other sources of advice, support and guidance accessed by social workers include: 
• Prevent team. Social workers contact the Prevent team when radicalisation cases 
arise to ask for their advice and support in addressing the concerns. The Prevent 
team will also often signpost to other resources that might inform the work. This 
was more likely to happen in Prevent-priority areas, which may be due to the fact 
that these areas are more likely to have a funded Prevent team or coordinator.  
• Channel panel: In some of the local authority areas that took part in the study, 
allocated social workers attend the Channel panel (as opposed or in addition to 
more senior children’s social care representatives). These areas report that 
attendance helps social workers to gain a more in-depth understanding of the 
radicalisation elements of the case and the key processes involved in Prevent and 
Channel.  
• Internal websites and resources. Many local authority stakeholders reported 
using internal local authority websites for signposting to referral pathways to 
Prevent/Channel, Prevent coordinators/leads, or local resources. This was 
common practice in addressing all forms of harm, not just radicalisation, and was 
seen as an appropriate and effective way of accessing support when needed. 
There was less awareness among frontline social workers of national resources 
they could access for support with radicalisation cases, suggested further 
signposting to these may be needed.  
• Group supervision/reflective practice. In some local authority areas, group 
supervision or reflective practice approaches are used on a consistent basis to 
provide ongoing learning across all cases. This can be particularly helpful for 
radicalisation cases as they are relatively rare, especially in non-priority areas 
where there is a low prevalence of radicalisation. In other areas, more informal 
conversations between social workers around how they have applied core social 
work approaches to a radicalisation cases were also identified as effective in 






• Multi-agency learning forums, debriefs or learning circles. In some of the 
consulted local authority areas, these are taking place after a case has closed to 
share experience and learning from all partners involved in the case. Although not 
specific to radicalisation, these forums can provide a useful platform to share 
radicalisation-specific learning. In areas where these forums are not taking place 
formally, stakeholders suggested they would be helpful in improving social worker’s 
confidence and skills in safeguarding against radicalisation and extremism.  
• Research in Practice publication. Some social workers reported that this 
publication was useful in providing easy-to-access information around 
radicalisation and other forms of harm that they can access in their own time.  
 
Figure 16: Promising practice example: Resource hub  
One non-priority local authority area has developed a ‘Be Aware’ knowledge hub. It is 
not radicalisation-specific but includes radicalisation resources. It covers information on 
how to spot the signs of the different forms of exploitation (including radicalisation), 
what a social worker should do if they are concerned about a child, and a range of 
other resources to use with children and young people, families and professionals. It 
sits alongside a strategy which is designed to strengthen the partnership’s response 
and engage with children and young people, their families and professional agencies to 
help prevent children and young people from falling victim to exploitation. This includes 
finding children and young people the support they need as well as targeting the 
perpetrators of radicalisation and exploitation.  
Strategic and operational leads in children’s social care suggested that this was an 
effective way for practitioners to access advice about radicalisation in an area where 
there is generally a low level of prevalence. It allows practitioners to research different 
risks and harms when cases emerge, rather than sharing a lot of detailed information in 
advance for all types of harm. This was considered the most useful and effective way 
to share information with social workers as it avoids overwhelming them with 
information they do not need. There are also plans to expand the resource hub to 






Appetite to share good practice across local authority areas 
Although these sources of advice and guidance are useful in providing support at a local 
level, there was also consensus that increased sharing of good practice between local 
authority areas would be helpful in improving social workers’ confidence and skills in 
safeguarding and radicalisation, and providing greater consistency in responding to 
radicalisation across different local authority areas. In particular, national, regional and 
local authority stakeholders reported that it would be helpful for: 
1. Areas with more experience in radicalisation to share knowledge with areas with 
less experience. This could include indicators of radicalisation, approaches to 
discussing radicalisation concerns with people from different cultures or religions, 
place-based information and data sharing, assessments and processes.  
2. Areas could share learning around specific challenges, such as how children’s 
social care might work with partner agencies when children and young people have 
returned from the Middle East after being radicalised and leaving the UK.33  
A few local authority areas in the study have already introduced some knowledge-sharing 
platforms to support information-sharing at a national or regional level. These include: 
• A regional children’s social care panel or learning event which can be used to 
share knowledge, learning and information across multiple local authority areas. 
Prevent or radicalisation can be a focus within these.  
• A regional Prevent training event led by CTP for all local authorities in a region, 
which focuses on using case studies to raise awareness of radicalisation and 
extremism.  
• Meetings of the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services (ADASS) and 
Association of Directors of Children’s Services (ADCS). These meetings can act 
as a way to align strategic approaches across different local authority areas.  
Levels and consistency of confidence, experience and 
understanding 
As a result of the training, advice, support and guidance discussed in the previous 
section, social workers generally feel confident in their knowledge of the identification, 
 
33 One such event has taken place since this research was conducted, organised by DfE and the 






referral and assessment processes involved with radicalisation cases (i.e., who to go to 
for advice, how to report and escalate concerns). These processes are broadly used 
consistently within individual local authority areas to respond to radicalisation as a 
safeguarding concern. This represents a change from the findings of Safeguarding and 
Radicalisation reported in 2017, which suggested there was a lack of internal consensus 
about the nature of the risk of radicalisation. 34 
However, social workers are generally less confident in directly working with children and 
young people at risk of radicalisation and their families. There was wide agreement that 
this is because most social workers have limited real-life experience of working on 
radicalisation cases. This means that the approach to direct work continues to vary 
considerably between different social workers in and across local authority areas, and 
may be more effective if a social worker has had previous experience of radicalisation 
cases. 
Gaining experience is a particular challenge for radicalisation cases. Even in Prevent-
priority areas with high prevalence, individual social workers’ involvement in cases is 
relatively infrequent, and certainly less frequent than involvement in cases of other forms 
of harm. As such, the majority of social workers do not have high levels of confidence in 
responding to radicalisation. This disparity in confidence can lead to many of the 
challenges explored in the previous chapter, such as using thresholds and engaging 
families (for more detail, see Chapter 4: Challenges to effective practice and potential 
solutions). CTP and Prevent stakeholders also reported that it leads to an inconsistent 
approach both across and within local authority areas in responding to radicalisation and 
applying agreed processes and practices.  
The lack of confidence can be linked to a few key aspects of radicalisation cases: 
• Identification. 
• Understanding and confidence to address radicalisation (including awareness and 
availability of evidence-based tools and interventions). 
• Type of ideology or harmful influencer. 
 
34 Please note that this research was not a follow-up study with the same local authorities included in the 
previous research conducted in 2016 (Safeguarding and Radicalisation, 2017) and different methods were 
used. As such any differences in findings may indicate changes which have occurred but may also be the 
result of different processes, practices or contexts in the local authorities included in each sample or 






• Taking a contextual safeguarding approach. 
• Understanding how radicalisation links to other types of exploitation. 
Each of these will be discussed in turn, along with additional advice, support and 
guidance that may be required to increase social workers’ skills and confidence in each 
area.  
Identification 
Reasons for low confidence 
Spotting indicators of radicalisation in children and young people  (both those with whom 
social workers already work, and those for whom they conduct a home visit or 
assessment after receiving a radicalisation-related referral) is a challenge for social 
workers, as they are less familiar with potential indicators due to the relatively low 
prevalence compared to other forms of harm. It is also made more difficult by the 
influencers and specific indicators of radicalisation constantly changing, making it hard 
for social workers to get ahead of the curve. 
An improved understanding of the vulnerability factors and indicators of radicalisation 
could improve social workers’ confidence and skills in identifying radicalisation. This kind 
of training on indicators was also flagged by participants in the 2017 study Safeguarding 
and Radicalisation as something that would be useful, suggesting that there is a 
continued consensus and appetite for this kind of guidance.  
Additional advice, support and guidance required 
Additional training around different indicators (such as language, identifying online peer 
networks, and logos representing different ideologies) would increase social workers’ 
skills in identifying radicalisation risks and assessing the scale of them. Due to the 
changing landscape of radicalisation and its associated risks, any training would need 
close monitoring and regular updates to ensure it includes the most relevant information.  
Understanding and confidence to address radicalisation 
Reasons for low confidence 
Some local authority stakeholders reported that social workers lack confidence to 






work and the evidence base for what works is limited. This correlates with the findings 
from Safeguarding and Radicalisation.  
However, some of the local authority area stakeholders consulted in this updated 
research suggested that the evidence base has in fact grown, but  social workers are not 
always aware of the resources which are available. Such resources included the Act 
Early website (which includes advice on spotting the signs of radicalisation, approaching 
conversations with people about concerns, how to make a referral to Prevent, and links 
to other organisations that can offer advice and support), internal specialist Prevent 
resources guidance for social workers around radicalisation and extremism which have 
been developed by local authorities and children’s social care newsletters.  
Social workers also reported different levels of understanding of the specific local 
interventions and organisations which could support children, young people and families, 
such as specific parenting programmes or local youth mentoring schemes. Levels of 
awareness of these interventions varied both within and across local authority areas, 
resulting in an inconsistent response. Social workers with experience of working on 
radicalisation cases generally had a greater awareness of what services may be 
available. Their awareness of services may also be linked to availability of services in 
different areas, which in turn may be linked to prevalence and demand. However, further 
investigation of a wider range of areas would be needed to make a judgement on this. 
Some social workers also said they lack confidence in addressing radicalisation due to 
anxiety that they could be held responsible for not mitigating the risk of radicalisation that 
may lead a criminal offence or act of terrorism effectively. Although this is equally true for 
all forms of harm, the risk was perceived as higher for radicalisation cases. 
Additional advice, support and guidance required 
Additional practical guidance on how to address radicalisation would be useful to social 
workers in increasing their skills, confidence, and knowledge in this area. Many children’s 
social care stakeholders also suggested that the use of a toolkit, similar to those already 
used in some areas for children and young people at risk of exploitation, would be 
particularly helpful. This might include guidance on what should be written into Prevent 
reports, or a rating scale of risk with suggestions of responses. This could help reduce 
some of the anxiety surrounding risk management. 
Practical guidance may also include further training around the extent to which existing 
social work skills are directly transferable to radicalisation cases. This might include 






harm, and how core social work processes in response to emotional harm can therefore 
be transferred to radicalisation cases.  
Children’s social care stakeholders also suggested that more guidance around when and 
where different approaches might be required for radicalisation cases would also be 
helpful. For example, one social work practitioner suggested that a radicalisation-specific 
assessment had been useful in providing guidance around how safeguarding against 
radicalisation might be different from usual safeguarding procedures, but does not 
require a specialist approach in most cases.  
 
Figure 17: Promising practice example: Radicalisation and extremism toolkit  
A local toolkit has been devised in one area to support social care practitioners to work 
with children and young people at risk of radicalisation and their families. It includes 
written and online resources from charities, specialist organisations, and the Home 
Office to help provide some context and general approaches to addressing 
radicalisation concerns.  
The Prevent team reported that social workers have found it useful to be able to pick 
up the toolkit and take it into the family home to help guide conversations and work with 
the young person and their family. However, they reported that it could be even more 
useful if specific tools and activities were added that social workers could use with the 








Figure 18: Promising practice example: Assessment questions and guidance 
In one case study area, the Prevent team provided practitioners working with children 
and young people with an explorative set of questions to assess the nature of 
radicalisation and extremism concerns being presented by a child or young person and 
their family.  
This consists of a series of questions that social workers and other practitioners can 
explore with the family to assess the nature of radicalisation concerns. These are 
divided into four themes: relationships and networks; views and behaviour; wellbeing, 
mental health and substance misuse; and history of extremism concerns. Social 
workers can use these questions to explore radicalisation with the young person and 
the family in a sensitive and respectful way.  
The guidance also provides signposting to government advice on international travel 
and terrorist groups or organisations, and outlines the contact details for designated 
points of contact within the Prevent team and children’s social care for queries about 
extremism. 
 
Type of ideology or harmful influencer 
Reasons for low confidence 
Experience of cases seems to be the determining factor as to whether a social worker is 
confident in working with certain types of ideology. For example, some local authority 
area stakeholders reported that social workers feel less confident in addressing Islamist 
extremism concerns due to their limited understanding of Islam. This anxiety is 
exacerbated in cases where intra-familial radicalisation is suspected; there is a 
professional anxiety around ensuring that faith-based discrimination does not come into 
play when addressing these concerns. It may also be linked to a historic mistrust of the 
Prevent agenda as anti-Islam within children’s social care, which has reduced in more 
recent years. Conversely, some local authority area stakeholders reported that social 
workers with existing experience of Islamist extremism cases feel more confident to 
address this type of radicalisation than Extreme Right-Wing cases. Other social workers 
are less confident in addressing mixed/unclear ideologies as often this type of extremism 
is not driven by ideological viewpoints, and it can therefore be difficult to challenge 






The type of harmful influencer also impacts upon social worker confidence in this area. 
For instance, some local authority and national/regional stakeholders suggested that 
social care practitioners tend to have a limited understanding of online radicalisation and 
how to respond it. This is becoming more of a challenge as radicalisation increasingly 
occurs online. Social workers also expressed concern that both online and intra-familial 
radicalisation can be intensive and that they are not able to give enough time to the 
young person in order to counteract the harmful influence and challenge people’s views.  
Additional advice, support and guidance required 
Practical guidance on how to approach radicalisation concerns with children, young 
people and families in a respectful and safe way with people from different cultures or 
religions would increase social workers’ confidence in addressing different ideological 
perspectives and promote a more consistent approach both within and across different 
local authority areas. This could include role modelling professional curiosity, or guidance 
on how to focus on the consequences of extremist actions, such as employability and 
relationships.  
Additional information about ideologies that are particularly prevalent in the local area (as 
indicated by CTP local profiles or risk assessments) may also increase social workers’ 
understanding of local challenges and improve their skills and confidence in addressing 
these challenges. This might be particularly useful for areas seeing a rise in radicalisation 
cases or an increase in less familiar ideologies. It could include specific indicators for 
different ideologies prevalent in a specific area and wider information about these 
ideologies (such as the messages being spread and the beliefs underpinning these). 
This information could also include more specific detail about the international and 
national context of the radicalising influencers and ideologies that are prevalent (or 
increasing in prevalence) in their local area to help social workers better understand the 
context of extremist views in the children and young people they might be supporting. For 
example, social workers in some areas where Islamist extremism was a concern said 
they would like more information around Islamic State activity in other countries. Multi-
agency forums may be helpful for sharing this knowledge (see Chapter  Chapter 3: 
Processes and practice) or it could be held by specialist Prevent or radicalisation roles 
and disseminated to the wider team (see sub section: Common and preferred sources of 
advice, support and guidance).  
Guidance for social workers on training parents in monitoring online activity was also 
identified as something that could be help tackle online radicalisation, as parents are in a 






Contextual safeguarding approach 
Reasons for low confidence 
As previously discussed, there are close links between contextual safeguarding and 
radicalisation, particularly in terms of providing an approach to how children’s social care 
can respond to extra-familial risk of harm (see sub-section: Contextual safeguarding 
approaches for more information). However, some social workers lack confidence to 
work in this way because contextual safeguarding is a relatively new approach. They are 
more confident in focusing on individual children, young people and families rather than 
looking at the wider context.  
Additional advice, support and guidance required 
Further training and practical guidance on how a contextual safeguarding approach can 
be used in the context of radicalisation cases may increase social workers’ confidence in 
this area.  
Links to other types of exploitation  
Reasons for low confidence 
As previously discussed, social care professionals in more strategic and senior 
operational roles often recognised similarities between the grooming processes involved 
in radicalisation and those involved in other types of exploitation, such as gangs, CSE 
and CCE. One area in particular is beginning to see a clear duality between children and 
young people being groomed into gangs and then subsequently being groomed into 
radicalisation or extremism, and vice versa.  
However, despite this link being previously identified in the 2017 report35 this 
understanding has not yet been translated into practice; local authority, national and 
regional stakeholders suggested that frontline social workers do not yet fully understand 
the parallel underlying vulnerabilities between those at risk of radicalisation and those at 
risk of other types of exploitation, nor how the approaches they use to address 
exploitation risks could be applied to radicalisation cases.  
Additional advice, support and guidance required 
Providing national and regional training and resources on grooming as a process that can 
branch into radicalisation as well as other forms of exploitation could help improve social 
 






workers’ confidence and skills in responding to radicalisation and give them the 
confidence to apply the work they do to address other types of exploitation to 
radicalisation cases. Such guidance might include additional information on the shared 
underlying vulnerabilities and ‘push and pull’ factors that put children and young people 
at risk of exploitation and radicalisation.  
Key learning could also be shared across local areas between teams that have 
experience addressing other types of exploitation and those working with children and 
young people at risk of radicalisation. For example, many stakeholders suggested that 
key lessons learned from mapping processes and identification of CSE and CCE could 
be applied to radicalisation, and toolkits used to address exploitation concerns with 






Chapter 6: Implications for policy and practice 
The findings from this report have 11 main implications for policy and practice. The 
majority of these implications fall under the responsibility of the DfE and local authority 
areas, with some applying to stakeholders from partner agencies as well. Table 7 
outlines each of the implications and who they mainly apply to (although this list is not 
exhaustive and there is likely to be some cross-over of responsibility for these 
recommendations for all organisations involved in safeguarding children and young 
people). These implications are then discussed in more detail below the table.   
Table 7: Summary of implications for policy and practice 
Implication  For consideration of…   
 Strengthening the increased recognition of radi-
calisation as a form of harm requiring standard 
safeguarding responses. 
DfE, local authority areas 
 Encouraging the inclusion of radicalisation in 
structures and approaches to addressing other 
forms of exploitation. 
Local authority areas 
 Increasing social workers’ confidence to apply 
their core skills and knowledge. 
Local authority areas 
 Encouraging the use of radicalisation-specific ap-
proaches where required.  
DfE, local authority areas 
 Investigating further the inclusion of radicalisa-
tion in children’s social care thresholds and re-
lated guidance. 
DfE, local authority areas 
 Promoting the routine attendance of children’s 
social care at Channel. 
DfE, local authority areas 
 Cultivating more effective partnership working. DfE, local authority areas, 
partner organisations 
(particularly CTP and Prevent) 
 Establishing specialist radicalisation/extremism 
roles within children’s social care. 
DfE, local authority areas 
 Maximising the efficacy and uptake of Prevent 
training for children’s social care.  






Implication  For consideration of…   
 Sharing good practice regionally and nationally. DfE, local authority areas, 
partner organisations 
 Generating more proactive multi-agency re-
sponses. 
 
DfE, local authority areas, 
partner organisations 
 
1. Strengthening the increased recognition of radicalisation as a form of harm 
requiring standard safeguarding responses. Radicalisation is increasingly 
recognised within children’s social care as a form of harm requiring a safeguarding 
response. It is generally accepted that many existing social work frameworks and 
practices can be applied in response to radicalisation, in order to engage children and 
young people and families, assess risk and support needs, and address underlying 
vulnerabilities36. Policy and guidance which reinforces the appropriateness of existing 
social work frameworks and practices for radicalisation may encourage their 
application, particularly if it is able to illustrate specific ways in which they apply. 
2. Encouraging the inclusion of radicalisation in structures and approaches to 
addressing other forms of exploitation. There is increasing recognition of the links 
between recruitment and grooming processes involved in other forms of exploitation 
and those involved in radicalisation. Introducing radicalisation cases into the remit or 
adolescent hubs or multi-agency teams/meetings using contextual safeguarding 
approaches in response to other types of exploitation may therefore be effective, and 
there is emerging evidence that some local areas are taking this approach. National 
and regional training and resources on the links between radicalisation and other 
forms of exploitation could also increase social workers’ confidence to apply 
contextual safeguarding approaches to radicalisation cases.  
3. Increasing social workers’ confidence to apply their core skills and knowledge. 
The extent to which existing social care approaches are applied effectively to 
radicalisation cases is heavily dependent on the experience, skills and confidence of 
social care staff. However, because of the relatively low prevalence of radicalisation in 
comparison to other forms of harm, delivering more specialist training as standard to 
 
36 Radicalisation-specific interventions may also be required, for example in relation to ideology. At present 







all social workers is unlikely to be feasible or to represent the best use of time and 
resources. As such, confidence may be boosted by including more material in existing 
Prevent training for social workers which makes it clear that radicalisation is a form of 
harm like other more frequently occurring forms of harm, and that social workers can 
apply their core skills and experience in cases involving (risk of) radicalisation. 
Equally, coaching and support from managers and staff in specialist children’s social 
care roles could contribute to increased confidence.  
4. Encouraging the use of radicalisation-specific approaches where required. 
Although core children’s social care skills and practices can generally be used in 
cases involving radicalisation, radicalisation-specific processes and practices by 
children’s social care are sometimes appropriate (see sub-section: Specific 
approaches and interventions). In particular, specific screening and assessment 
processes which involve joint work with Prevent or Channel representatives appear to 
increase the likelihood of a multi-agency response which identifies and addresses 
radicalisation and wider risks and harm. These might involve the use of standard 
screening and assessment tools or the use of radicalisation-specific tools. For 
example, the National Prevent Referral form can support children’s social care staff to 
screen for radicalisation risks.37 In standard tools, it is useful to include explicit 
references to radicalisation in order that those referring, screening or assessing cases 
are prompted to identify and articulate any radicalisation concerns as part of a more 
holistic approach.  
Practical guidance and resources on radicalisation which social workers can access 
as and when needed could also be useful. This might include the information provided 
in introductory and enhanced training, as well as signposting to additional resources 
and good practice examples. In addition, it should include: detail on local processes 
and referral pathways; links to key referral and case work documentation; and contact 
details for people in specialist roles and teams who could provide further advice, 
coaching and support. It is possible that the core elements of such a toolkit could be 
developed centrally or regionally – perhaps drawing on existing examples from 
individual local areas – and then localised as needed. 
5. Investigating further the inclusion of radicalisation in children’s social care 
thresholds and related guidance. Some local areas have written radicalisation into 
their children’s social care thresholds and guidance and others reported their intention 
to do so in the future. Most national and regional stakeholders suggested that this 
would help clarify and standardise judgements and practice about whether social care 
 






input is required and at what level. However, some local areas also reported that it is 
more important to encourage children’s social care professionals to work flexibly with 
existing thresholds in order to apply them to cases of harm which fall outside of the 
more frequently encountered forms of harm, and especially to cases involving extra-
familial harm. As there was no definitive shared view on this, further research may be 
required to explore existing practice across a wider range of local authority areas and 
the benefits of inclusion or non-inclusion in thresholds. If it proves desirable to include 
radicalisation within the thresholds, it will be important to ensure that this is rolled out 
to all areas and incorporated in ways that promotes consistent and effective 
responses.  
6. Promoting the routine attendance of children’s social care at Channel. Channel 
is one of the key multi-agency structures to support partnership working in relation to 
radicalisation. In some areas, senior children’s social care representatives routinely 
attend Channel panel, even for cases in which there is no current children’s social 
care involvement. This helps increase the coordination and consistency of social care 
input into cases and can provide a useful route via which to escalate cases where 
safeguarding concerns are subsequently identified. Policy and guidance which 
mandates the attendance of senior children’s social care representatives at Channel 
might further encourage and improve social care input into radicalisation cases..  
7. Cultivating more effective partnership working. Several challenges were identified 
in relation to partnership working. These included information-sharing, partners using 
different thresholds, developing a shared understanding of risk and response, and 
engaging families. Close liaison and joint visits between children’s social care and 
partner organisations (especially CTP and Prevent teams), multi-agency training for 
all partners on their different roles in responding to radicalisation, and developing 
designated points of contact across all organisations can help address these. 
Seconding social workers in CTP is also a way to receive and share information with 
the police.  
8. Establishing specialist radicalisation/extremism roles within children’s social 
care. Some areas have designated children’s social care posts with a specialism in 
radicalisation/extremism (either as their sole specialism or combined with other 
related specialisms). This person can act as a designated point of contact for partner 
agencies, thus supporting information-sharing and partnership working. They also 
provide a single point of advice, guidance and coaching for social workers assigned to 
radicalisation cases, helping to develop a consistent and effective approach to 






prevalence, a formalised post may not be necessary, but a more informal role (such 
as a Prevent Champion or a social worker with experience and/or interest in 
radicalisation and extremism) could be a useful source of advice and support.  
9. Maximising the efficacy and uptake of Prevent training for children’s social 
care. Stakeholders reported that radicalisation training is most effective when it 
includes face-to-face training in combination with e-learning modules, when it uses 
real-life examples, and when it is delivered to multi-agency groups. As already 
discussed, there are challenges in creating time and space for all social workers to 
complete in-depth training and this may not be the most effective use of resource, 
particularly in non-priority areas with lower prevalence. As a consequence, tiered 
training may be a more pragmatic approach and could include:  
• Introductory training for all social workers, which includes (as a minimum) an 
introduction to Prevent, radicalisation and the role of children’s social care within 
this; reinforcing that (risk of) radicalisation requires a safeguarding response; an 
outline of key local processes, structures and partners involved in tackling 
radicalisation; information on indicators and how to identify them; and emphasis 
on applying core social work skills and knowledge in cases involving 
radicalisation.  
• An enhanced offer for a selection of social workers and managers who can then 
disseminate this knowledge within teams. This might include more specific 
information about ideologies and influencers (ideally localised to the area), as 
well as further detail on radicalisation-specific interventions and approaches to 
tackle these. 
Increased monitoring of training uptake is also needed to ensure all social workers 
receive introductory Prevent training as intended and to help gauge the proportion of 
children’s social care staff who have received enhanced training. 
10. Sharing good practice regionally and nationally. At present there were limited 
examples of promising practice being shared across children’s social care teams in 
different local areas. However, there was appetite to share knowledge and learning 
regionally and nationally, including suggestions that: 
• Areas with more experience in radicalisation share knowledge with areas with 
less experience. This could include indicators of radicalisation, approaches to 






religions, place-based information and data sharing, assessments and 
processes.  
• Areas share learning around specific challenges, such as how children’s social 
care might work with partner agencies when children and young people have 
returned from the Middle East after being radicalised and leaving the UK.  
This might also be a useful route to increase consistency of practice within and 
between regions. 
11. Generating more proactive multi-agency responses. Strategic leads and frontline 
practitioners suggested that multi-agency working could be used to generate more 
proactive responses to radicalisation and extremism. For example, intelligence could 
be better shared between partners about the vulnerabilities present in communities 
which might lead to radicalisation, and more time could be invested in children and 
young people through youth organisations and schools to address the underlying 
vulnerabilities that might lead to radicalisation. Increased capacity and resource would 
be needed to enable children’s social care to effectively contribute to any joint 







Appendix 1: Topic guide for initial workshop with PEO sub-
group 
Introduction 
Thank you very much for agreeing to talk to us today. We work for Cordis Bright, an 
independent research organisation. We have been commissioned by the Department for 
Education to investigate and update their understanding of how children’s social care 
services in England are managing cases of radicalisation or extremism amongst children 
and young people aged under 18. 
We understand that the PEO sub-group has already done a lot of work on current 
practice in relation to safeguarding against radicalisation and extremism in children’s 
social care. We would therefore like to speak to you to gain a greater understanding of 
current practice and views of children’s social care staff in this area. This will: 
a. Provide useful context for the research and help to generate early findings. 
b. Help us understand whether the topics we are intending to investigate as part of 
the research are correct, and whether we are missing any important lines of in-
quiry. 
c. Help us shape the questions we will ask local authority staff and national/regional 
stakeholders later on in the research. 
We will not share any individual views or experiences you discuss here outside of the 
Cordis Bright research team. We will not attribute any comments to you or to the PEO 
group specifically in any report we produce for this research. The only exception to this is 
if you mention something which raises safeguarding concerns, in which case we would 
have to pass this information on to the relevant authorities. However, we would make 
every attempt to discuss this with you first. 
If we discuss specific local authority areas or anonymised cases during this meeting, we 
may ask your permission to discuss this information with colleagues at the DfE and/or 
with other research participants in order to design and deliver the research.  
If you have any questions as we go through the call, please just let us know. The call 







1. Please could we go around, and everyone say their name, which LA they work in, and 
how long they have been a PEO. 
2. Please could you tell us a little bit about the background of the PEO group and what 
its purpose is? [prompts: how long has the group been running, how does it operate, 
who is in the group, how/why were group members selected?] 
3. We are aiming to finish at about [insert time here] – does anyone have to leave early? 
Questions 
The objectives for this research are to get a clear and current understanding of the 
following areas: 
a. Views amongst children’s social care professionals on how process and practices 
have developed in recent years with regards to managing cases of radicalisation 
and extremism. 
b. How staff in children’s social care and other professionals or agencies are cur-
rently tackling issues. 
c. Good and promising practice in this area. 
d. The different types of challenges posed by various types of radicalisation cases. 
e. Sources of information, advice and support used by children’s social care staff. 
We would now like to discuss each of these topics in turn, to gain an understanding of 
current practice. We will then talk about any other lines of inquiry that we may be 
missing.  
Before we begin, we understand from Tim that you may have already pulled together 
some common threads/findings from recent months. Would you prefer to share these 
now, or to discuss these as we go through the questions we had in mind? 
Current practice and how it has changed 
4. What can you tell us about how children’s social care are currently tackling 
radicalisation and extremism?  
 
Prompts: 
a. Do you have an understanding of the specific approaches and interventions that  
children’s social care staff are using to manage or input into these cases? (If so, 






b. What are these approaches and interventions? 
c.  Do approaches differ in different local authority areas and what might explain 
these differences? 
d. Have approaches changed in recent years?  
e. Are approaches specific to cases of radicalisation and extremism or do they over-
lap with other types of harm to under ‘18’s? 
f. How (if at all) has COVID-19 affected process and practices? What has changed 
and what has been the impact of this change? 
g. How confident do you think children’s social care staff are in their ability to man-
age or input cases of radicalisation/extremism? 
h. How involved are children’s social care staff as a partner in interventions ad-
dressing radicalisation? How confident are children’s social care staff in their abil-
ity to work with other local partners? What approaches to partnership working are 
being used? Have these changed in recent years?  
i. Do you think there is enough specific training available for this sector base on 
their experience? 
j. What kinds of questions do children’s social care staff ask in training? 
  
5. What (if any) types of radicalisation and extremism cases are emerging in different 
local authority areas? 
 
Good and promising practice 
6. Can you think of any examples of particular approaches and interventions that have 
worked well in delivering positive outcomes for children and young people? [Prompts: 
particularly in relation to engagement with services; safeguarding and reduced 
influence of negative influences, and; diversion from further involvement in 
extremism? What are these approaches and what is the evidence to their efficacy? 
7. Do these approaches and interventions vary in different circumstances or context? 
Could they be transferable across the sector? 
e.g. variance in: 
a. LAs/local prevalence of radicalisation/extremism? 
b. Partnership working arrangements? 
c. Methods of radicalisation 
d. Types of extremism? 
e. Ages of CYP? 
f. Settings for identification of radicalisation and extremism? 






Different challenges posed by various types of radicalisation cases 
8. What do you think are the main challenges posed by radicalisation cases? 
Specifically, are there different challenges relating to: 
a. Identification of cases 
b. Development and agreement of processes, partnership working approaches and 
interventions  
c. Delivery of these approaches 
9. Have these challenges changed in the last three years or so? 
10. Do the challenges vary across local authorities or types of partnership? If so, what 
might explain this variation? 
11. Do these challenges vary in cases of radicalisation to different types of 
extremism/types of harmful influence? 
Sources of information, advice and support for social care staff 
12. What sources of information, advice and support do social care staff use when 
radicalisation cases emerge? [Prompts: including local, regional, national resources? 
Is this consistent within and across LAs? Has it changed over the last three years? 
13. What type of information, advice and support do you think is most helpful? 
Other areas of investigation 
14. Do you think the topics we’ve discussed so far are the most useful ones to cover with 
LA staff and other stakeholders in this research? Are there any other key lines of 
inquiry we may be missing? 
15. Do you have any advice on the framing and language of questions that we ask LA 
staff and national/regional stakeholders? [e.g. have we been using the correct 
terminology, are there any names of specific interventions/processes it would be 
useful for us to know and use?] 
16. Do you have a view on whether hypothetical scenarios drawing on examples of real-
life anonymous cases may be useful to incorporate into consultation with local 
authority staff?  Do you think they will be able to comment in-depth on the areas we 
have covered without the use of hypothetical scenarios? If you think hypothetical 
scenarios would be useful, do you have any examples of real-life anonymous cases 






children’s social care staff are tackling issues c) good and promising practice d) 
challenges posed by various types of radicalisation cases e) sources of 
information/advice?] 
17. Is there anything else that you would like to say that we have not already covered that 
you think it would be useful for us to know? 





Appendix 2: Topic guide for local authority area case studies 
Introduction 
Thank you very much for agreeing to talk to us today. Cordis Bright has been 
commissioned by the Department for Education (DfE) to investigate and update their 
understanding of how Children’s Social Care services in England are managing cases of 
radicalisation or extremism amongst young people aged under 18. We would like to talk 
to you because the DfE have identified [insert name of LA area] as a local authority that 
they think could provide key insights to include in this research.  
The research seeks to engage with practitioners from a diverse range of local authorities 
to gather views from a variety of different contexts and levels of experience in responding 
to cases.  The study aims to collect examples of good practice and solutions as well as 
better understand the challenges faced. The interview will focus on: 
• How processes and practices have recently developed. 
• How Children’s Social Care staff are currently tackling issues or would expect to do 
so where cases emerge. 
• Examples of good and promising practice. 
• The different challenges posed by various types of radicalisation cases or risks. 
• The sources of information, advice and support that social care staff use. 
There are no right or wrong answers – we are just interested in hearing your thoughts 
and experiences.  Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary and you are free 
to withdraw at any point.  All discussions will be anonymised before they are shared 
beyond the Cordis Bright Research team, unless you are entirely comfortable with this. 
For example, to recognise and share examples of good practice with DfE and potentially 
other LAs. This will not be done without your express consent. If you are at all 
uncomfortable with this, we will not identify your area to the DfE in this way. 
If you have any questions as we go through please just let me know. You do not have to 
answer any questions you do not want to and we can stop the session at any time. The 
discussion should take around an hour.  
Questions 
Introductions 







2. Have you had any direct involvement in cases where children and young people have 
been radicalised or were at risk of being radicalised? If so, roughly how many cases 
have you been involved with and how were you involved? [Note for researcher: 
reassure those with less direct experience that their views are also very still valuable 
to the research] 
Prevalence and types of cases emerging? 
3. Do you have a sense of how common radicalisation and extremism cases are in your 
local authority area? [What are the rates at which cases are emerging? Have rates 
changed in recent years? How do you measure prevalence locally? E.g. Are there 
specific flags on case recording systems for radicalisation/extremism? 
4. What kinds of cases (if any) are emerging? Specifically:  
a. What ideologies are people being radicalised to and has this changed in recent 
years?  
b. What (or who) are the main radicalising influences/mechanisms and has this 
changed in recent years? [Intra-/extra-familial, online/face-to-face] 
c. Are there any common characteristics or circumstances of young people who 
have been radicalised or are at risk of radicalisation and have these changed in 
recent years? [overlapping vulnerabilities, prevalence of SEN, engagement/ab-
sence from education, family circumstances, limited sense of belonging] 
Current practice 
5. What (if any) safeguarding structures and processes are in place in your local area to 
plan and deliver interventions with children and young people who have been 
radicalised or are at risk of radicalisation? [E.g. multi-agency panels, referral 
pathways into Children’s Social Care or other agencies, recognition of radicalisation 
within thresholds]. And have these structures and processes changed in recent 
years? Specifically: 
a. By what processes are children and young people being identified as at risk [e.g. 
looking at specific risk factors, referrals from others – who makes these refer-
rals?].  
b. To what extent are processes reactive (to respond to cases) vs. proactive (to pre-
vent cases)? 
c. Do ‘processes’ include data collection and information sharing locally? 
d. Do these differ from structure and processes to safeguard children and young 
people from other types of harm? How do they relate to local Channel panels and 
processes?  
e. If the area was non-priority and became a priority area, did structures and pro-






6. Which (if any) aspects of these processes and structures do you think are working 
particularly well? Which (if any) could be improved? Why do you say this? In what 
ways do the more successful components support your practice?    
7. Within Children’s Social Care, who is the strategic lead for responding to 
radicalisation and extremism? Has the strategic lead changed in recent years? 
8. Within Children’s Social Care are there any practitioners with specific roles in relation 
to radicalisation and extremism? [E.g. designated social worker, senior practitioner, 
Prevent Champion. If so, how long have these roles been in operation and what 
impact do you think these roles have?] 
9. When working on cases or risks of radicalisation involving children and young people 
are there specific approaches or frameworks that you use or would expect to use 
more than others? [E.g. specific tools or interventions by social workers, contextual 
safeguarding approaches. If so, how effective do you think these are in engaging 
young people and families and addressing radicalisation and extremism? Do these 
approaches differ to those you would use in relation to other types of harm?] 
10. Do approaches and interventions vary in different circumstances or contexts? [If yes] 
Why is that? Why do some things work better for particular contexts? 
E.g. variance in: 
a. Methods of radicalisation? 
b. Ages of children and young people? 
c. Settings for identification of radicalisation and extremism? 
d. Family or community contexts?  
e. Different types of radicalisation [Islamist, right-wing, mixed/clear/unstable ideolo-
gies]? 
f. Different types of harmful influencers [familial, extra-familial, or primarily online]? 
11. Are there any other roles, local or national agencies or interventions in your local area 
that you would expect to work in partnership with, or refer children and young people 
to? [E.g. specialist roles in other agencies, specific interventions to build resilience to 
radicalisation or other harmful influences; VCS organisations perceived as legitimate 
by children, young people and families. If so, how effective do you think these are in 
addressing radicalisation and extremism?]   
12. To what extent do you think that local multi-agency working between Children’s Social 






Which partner agencies are Children’s Social Care working with and which are not 
involved? How (if at all) could multi-agency working be improved?  
13. How consistent is Children’s Social Care practice across the local authority area in 
relation to radicalisation or risk of it? [Variation by different districts/teams, importance 
of particular personalities or relationships]  
14. Other than any good practice we have discussed so far, is there any other good 
practice in your local area that you would like to highlight? [Particularly in relation to 
positive outcomes in engagement with services; safeguarding and reduced influence 
of negative influences, and diversion from further involvement in extremism? 
15. Do you think that good practice is very specific to the local area or do you think it 
could be transferred from one local authority area to another? Why do you say this?    
Challenges 
16. How confident do you feel in your ability and that of colleagues in Children’s Social 
Care to input into cases of radicalisation and extremism? [Which aspects gave you 
most confident – training or personal experience (or something else)? Is there 
anything that could give you more confidence?] 
17. Have you come across any challenges posed by radicalisation cases? If so, what are 
the main challenges?  
E.g. challenges related to: 
a. Identification of cases. 
b. Development and agreement of processes, partnership working approaches and 
interventions. 
c. Delivery of these approaches. 
d. Involving families and communities in discussing children and young people at 
risk. 
e. Limited awareness by professionals of the approaches available to prevent or 
tackle radicalisation. 
f. Limited evidence relating to the efficacy of different interventions to safeguard 
and promote resilience. 
g. Developing credible counter-messaging from voices which children, young people 
and families view as legitimate. 
18. Do these challenges vary depending on the types of radicalisation [Islamist, right-
wing, mixed/clear/unstable ideologies] or harmful influencers [familial, extra-familial, 







19. Have these challenges changed in recent years? If so, how?  
Training and Continuous Professional Development 
20. What (if any) Prevent and radicalisation training is delivered to Children’s Social Care 
staff in your local area? How would you rate this training?  Are there ways in which 
training could be improved? [E.g. additional topics covered, frequency of training, 
roles targeted] 
21. What format of training would you find most useful? [E.g. e-learning/face-to-face/self-
directed study, multi-agency/single agency, single session/longer programme] 
Other sources of information, advice and support 
22. What sources of information, advice and support  are available for you and other 
Children’s Social Care staff when radicalisation cases arise (if any)? [Including local, 
regional, national resources? How would you rate these resources? [Have these 
changed over the last three years?] 
23. Is there any additional information, advice or support that you think would be helpful in 
supporting you with radicalisation cases? [How best can social care staff obtain 
guidance and advice in areas where cases are likely to be rare?] 
24. How would you most like to engage with information, advice and support on these 
cases? [E.g. designated person to ask for support such as PEO/Prevent 
Champion/Senior Practitioner, provision of support materials, learning/good practice 
network] 
Other areas of investigation 
25. Is there anything else that we have not already covered that you think it would be 
useful for us to know? 
26. Do you have any local protocols, guidance or other documentation that it may be 
useful for us to review to learn more about process and practices in relation to 
safeguarding against radicalisation and extremism? If so, would you please be able to 
share this with us? 







Appendix 3: Topic guide for consultation with national and 
regional stakeholders 
Introduction 
Thank you very much for agreeing to talk to us today. Cordis Bright has been 
commissioned by the Department for Education (DfE) to investigate and update their 
understanding of how Children’s Social Care services in England are managing cases of 
radicalisation or extremism amongst young people aged under 18. We would like to talk 
to you because the DfE have identified you as someone they are extremely interested in 
hearing from, who could offer useful and valuable insights to include in this research. 
The research seeks to engage with practitioners from a diverse range of local authorities 
to gather views from a variety of different contexts and levels of experience in responding 
to cases.  The study aims to collect examples of good practice and solutions as well as 
better understand the challenges faced. The interview will focus on: 
• How processes and practices have recently developed. 
• How Children’s Social Care staff are currently tackling issues or would expect to do 
so where cases emerge. 
• Examples of good and promising practice. 
• The different challenges posed by various types of radicalisation cases or risks. 
• The sources of information, advice and support that social care staff use. 
There are no right or wrong answers – we are just interested in hearing your thoughts 
and experiences.  Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary and you are free 
to withdraw at any point.  All discussions will be anonymised before they are shared 
beyond the Cordis Bright Research team, unless you are entirely comfortable with this. 
For example, to recognise and share examples of good practice with DfE and potentially 
other LAs. This will not be done without your express consent. If you are at all 
uncomfortable with this, we will not identify your area to the DfE in this way. 
If you have any questions as we go through please just let me know. You do not have to 
answer any questions you do not want to and we can stop the session at any time. The 






Questions   
Introductions 
1. What is your role and how does it relate to safeguarding children and young people? 
2. Are there particular elements of your role which relate to radicalisation and 
extremism, or which give you insight into these issues?  
Prevalence and types of case emerging 
3. Do you have a sense of how common radicalisation and extremism cases are, either 
nationally or in the local authority area(s) you know about? [What are the rates at 
which cases are emerging? Have rates changed in recent years? How is prevalence 
measured?] 
4. What kinds of cases (if any) are emerging? Specifically:  
5. What ideologies are people being radicalised to and has this changed in recent 
years?  
6. What (or who) are the main radicalising influences/mechanisms and has this changed 
in recent years? [Intra-/extra-familial, online/face-to-face] 
7. Are there any common characteristics or circumstances of young people who have 
been radicalised or are at risk of radicalisation and have these changed in recent 
years? [overlapping vulnerabilities, prevalence of SEN, engagement/absence from 
education, family circumstances, limited sense of belonging] 
Current and good practice 
8. What safeguarding structures, processes and approaches are in place to plan and 
deliver interventions with children and young people who have been radicalised or are 
at risk of radicalisation? And have these changed in recent years?  
9. [Note to researcher: if participant has insight into one local authority area, ask them to 
describe practice in this area. If they have insight into more than one area, ask if they 
are able to discuss the most common practice across areas and the extent to which 
this varies].  






a. Multi-agency panels, referral pathways into Children’s Social Care or other agen-
cies, recognition of radicalisation within thresholds (and how these relate to local 
Channel panels and processes). 
b. Processes by which children and young people are being identified as at risk [e.g. 
looking at specific risk factors, referrals from others – who makes these refer-
rals?]. 
c. To what extent processes are reactive (to respond to cases) vs. proactive (to pre-
vent cases). 
d. Whether processes include data collection and information sharing locally. 
e. The allocation of the strategic lead within Children’s Social Care. 
f. Whether there tend to be Children’s Social Care practitioners with specific roles in 
relation to radicalisation and extremism [E.g. designated social worker, senior 
practitioner, Prevent Champion]. 
g. Approaches or frameworks that Children’s Social Care practitioners use more 
than others? [E.g. specific tools or interventions by social workers, contextual 
safeguarding approaches.] 
h. Other roles, agencies or interventions that Children’s Social Care would expect to 
work in partnership with or refer children and young people to? [E.g. specialist 
roles in other agencies, specific interventions to build resilience to radicalisation 
or other harmful influences; VCS organisations perceived as legitimate by chil-
dren, young people and families] 
11. Which (if any) aspects of these processes and structures do you think are working 
particularly well? Which (if any) could be improved? Why do you say this? In what 
ways do the more successful components support effective practice and successful 
engagement of young people and families?  
12. Do approaches and interventions by Children’s Social Care (and relevant partners) 
vary in different circumstances or contexts? [If yes] Why is that? Why do some things 
work better for particular contexts? 
E.g. variance in: 
a. Methods of radicalisation? 
b. Ages of children and young people? 
c. Settings for identification of radicalisation and extremism? 
d. Family or community contexts?  
e. Different types of radicalisation?[Islamist, right-wing, mixed/clear/unstable ideolo-
gies]? 
f. Different types of harmful influencers [familial, extra-familial, or primarily online]? 
13. How much do you think that approaches by Children’s Social Care – and their 
effectiveness – vary across different local authority areas? What might explain any 







14. How consistent is Children’s Social Care practice within individual local authority area 
in relation to radicalisation or risk of it?[Variation by different districts/teams, 
importance of particular personalities or relationships] 
15. From your experience, how confident do you think Children’s Social Care staff feel in 
their ability to manage or input into cases of radicalisation/extremism? Does this vary 
within and between local authority areas? 
16. Are there particular local authority areas (including those you work in) in which you 
feel structures, processes or practice in relation to safeguarding and radicalisation are 
particularly strong? If so, please could you describe practice in this area? 
17. Other than any good practice we have discussed so far, is there any other good 
practice in Children’s Social Care’s responses to radicalisation and extremism that 
you would like to highlight? [Particularly in relation to positive outcomes in 
engagement with services; safeguarding and reduced influence of negative 
influences, and diversion from further involvement in extremism?] 
18. Do you think that good practice is very specific to local areas or do you think it could 
be transferred from one local authority area to another? Why do you say this?    
Challenges 
19. What (if any) do you think are the core strategic and systemic challenges to Children’s 
Social Care staff in delivering effective safeguarding and support to young people 
who have been radicalised or are at risk of radicalisation?   
E.g. challenges relating to: 
a. Identification of cases. 
b. Development and agreement of processes, partnership working approaches and 
interventions.  
c. Delivery of these approaches. 
d. Involving families and communities in discussing children and young people at 
risk. 
e. Limited awareness by professionals of the approaches available to prevent or 
tackle radicalisation. 
f. Limited evidence relating to the efficacy of different interventions to safeguard 
and promote resilience. 
g. Developing credible counter-messaging from voices which children and young 






20. Do these challenges vary depending on the types of radicalisation [Islamist, right-
wing, mixed/clear/unstable ideologies] or harmful influencers [familial, extra-familial, 
or primarily online]? 
21. Have these challenges changed in recent years? If so, how?  
22. Do you know whether challenges vary across local authorities or types of 
partnership? If so, what might explain this variation?  
Training, information, advice and support for Children’s Social Care staff 
23. How widespread, consistent and effective do you think current Prevent and 
radicalisation training is for Children’s Social Care staff? Are there ways in which it 
could be improved? [E.g. additional topics covered, frequency of training, roles 
targeted, delivery mechanism. Have you experienced any helpful training that you 
think it would be helpful for Children’s Social Care staff to have access to?] 
24. Are you aware of any sources of information, advice and support that are available for 
Children’s Social Care staff when radicalisation cases arise? How would you rate 
these resources? [Including local, regional, national resources. Have these changed 
over the last three years?] 
25. Is there any additional information, advice or support that you think would be helpful in 
supporting Children’s Social Care staff with radicalisation cases? [How best can 
social care staff obtain guidance and advice in areas where cases are likely to be 
rare?] 
26. What do you think are the most effective ways to offer information, advice and support 
on these cases? [E.g. designated person to ask for support such as PEO/Prevent 
Champion/Senior Practitioner, provision of support materials, learning/good practice 
network] 
Other areas of investigation 
27. Is there anything else that we have not already covered that you think it would be 
useful for us to know? 
28. Do you have any protocols, guidance or other documentation that it may be useful for 
us to review to learn more about process and practices in relation to safeguarding 
against radicalisation and extremism? If so, would you please be able to share this 
with us? 
Thank you very much for your time today. 
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